What impact could the NATO defence spending renegotiation have on EU budgets, bonds and stocks?

What impact could the NATO defence spending renegotiation have on EU budgets, bonds and stocks?

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Macro Letter – No 71 – 24-02-2017

What impact could the NATO defence spending renegotiation have on EU budgets, bonds and stocks?

  • In 2006 NATO partners agreed to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence
  • Germany’s defence spending shortfall since 2006 equals $281bln
  • Retrospective adjustment is unlikely, but Europe needs to increase spending substantially
  • A minimum of $64bln/annum is required from Germany, France, Italy and Spain alone

Given the mutual relationship of the NATO treaty it could be argued that, for many years the US has been footing the lion’s share of the bill for defending Europe. Under the new US administration this situation is very likely to change.

The July 2016 Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016) presents the situation in clear terms. At the Riga summit back in 2006 NATO members agreed to raise defence expenditure to 2% of GDP. In that year only six countries met the threshold – Bulgaria, France, Greece, Turkey, the UK, and the US. Eight years later, at the NATO meeting in Wales, members renewed their commitment to this target. Last year only five members achieved the threshold – Estonia, Greece, Poland, the UK, and, of course, the US.

The original NATO treaty was signed on 4th April 1949 by 12 countries, it was expanded in 1952 to include Turkey and Greece and in 1955 to incorporate Germany. In 1982, after reverting to a democracy, Spain also joined. Further expansion occurred in 1999, again in 2004 and most recently 2009.

Back in 1949 Europe was still recovering from the disastrous social and economic impact of WWII. Today, in the post-Cold War era, things look very different and yet, whilst defence spending has waxed and waned over the intervening years, the US still spends substantially more on defence, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, than any of its treaty partners. The table below reveals the magnitude of the current situation:-

nato_expenditure_-_geopolitical_futures

Source: Geopolitical Futures, Mauldin Economics

US defence spending last year amounted to $664bln which equates to 3.61% of US GDP based on current estimates.

Setting aside the political debate about whether we should be spending more or less on defence, it would appear that the US continues to do more than its fair share, in economic terms, in defence of its NATO allies.

The next table looks at the budgetary implications of making the NATO budget equable. Firstly, all NATO countries committing 2% of GDP to defence (which would dramatically reduce the total NATO budget) or, secondly, maintaining the current level of spending, which would imply all countries contributing 2.58% of GDP. In both scenarios the US is a clear winner in economic terms:-

nato_expenditure_as_percentage_of_gdp_-_analysis-1

Source: NATO, UN, IMF

I have excluded the smaller, mainly Eastern European, countries from this analysis – their combined contribution is less than $13bln/annum. I do not wish to appear disparaging, on a percentage of GDP basis many of these countries contribute more than their larger European neighbours. My purpose in this analysis is to look at the relative increases or decreases under each scenario. Below are the Budget to GDP and Debt to GDP ratios before and after adjustment to the less demanding 2% defence expenditure target:-

nato_budget_and_debt_to_gdp_after_adjustment_to_2_

Source: NATO, UN, IMF, Trading Economics

The Maastricht Treaty incorporated certain criteria in order to satisfy Germany, along with other cautious countries, of the fiscal rectitude of all countries seeking to join the Eurozone. Although they were never really taken seriously by politicians, these fiscal restrictions included a maximum Government debt to GDP ratio of 60% and a Budget deficit to GDP ratio of less than 3%. Applying these arcane criteria, only three countries – Denmark, Norway and Turkey – are in the enviable position of being able to undertake the required defence spending increases with equanimity.

The burning question going forward is how the largest countries in Europe will react to the US compliant that they have failed to increase spending since 2006. As George Friedman of Geopolitical Futures – The Evolving NATO Alliance succinctly explains:-

…the US accounts for about 50% of NATO members’ total GDP and 32% of their total population—and yet the US makes up about 72% of defense spending.

… Western European countries (excluding the UK) account for 31% of NATO members’ GDP and 33%  of their population, and yet they contribute 16%  to NATO members’ total defense spending.

Eastern European countries, which account for 4.2% of NATO members’ GDP and 12.7% of their population, are much poorer and smaller than Western European countries. Eastern Europe contributes 2.7% to defense spending. In effect, Eastern Europe contributes closer to its share than its far wealthier and stronger neighbors to the west.

According to SIPRI Milex data for 2015, Russia spent 5.4% of GDP on defence. Other notable defenders of their realms include Pakistan (3.4%) and India (2.3%).

At the Munich Security Conference which took place last weekend, the prospect of Germany finding an extra Eur20bln per year for defence spending was raised, but, being an election year, little more was heard on the topic. The conference was fascinating however, here are some of the key quotes:-

A stable EU is as much in America’s interest as a united NATO – Ursula von der Leyen – Minister of Defence – Germany.

American security is permanently tied to European security – James Mattis – Secretary of Defence – USA.

The role of Germany in Europe is always to be a bridge – between North and South and East and West – Wolfgang Schauble – Minister of Finance – Germany.

Make no mistake, my friends. You should not count America out – John McCain – Chairman of Senate Committee on Armed Services – USA.

Let us not forget that NATO is the backbone of our value system – Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert – Minister of Defence – Netherlands.

NATO is not an obsolete organisation. It is an organisation to which additional mandates should be added – Fikri Isik – Minister of National Defence – Turkey.

The United States of America strongly supports NATO and will be unwavering in our commitment to this Transatlantic alliance – Michael Pence – Vice President – USA.

Europe’s defence requires your support as much as ours – Michael Pence – Vice President – USA.

Things look very different if we add up our defence budgets, our development aid budgets and our humanitarian efforts all around the world – Jean-Claude Juncker – President – European Commission

The post-war generation rose to their challenge, we must rise to ours – Jens Stoltenberg – Secretary General – NATO.

The European Union is much stronger than we European’s realise – Federica Mogherini – Vice President – European Commission – High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – EU.

No one has any clue what the foreign policy of this administration is – Christopher Murphy – Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

From a negotiating perspective it would not be entirely unreasonable for the US to demand that the 2006 commitment of 2% spending be honoured retrospectively, in addition to the 2% commitment going forward. The table below shows how NATO members have performed in this respect since 2005, apart from the US, only Greece and the UK have been above target over the entire period. American frustration with its NATO partners is hardly surprising:-

nato_defense_expenditure_as_percentage_of_gdp_-_ge

Source: NATO, Geopolitical Futures

The tone of US comments at the Munich conference appear slightly more conciliatory than of late. Europe’s defence ministries have, nonetheless, been seriously shaken by the change in attitude which has accompanied the change of US administration.

According to commentators, who purport to have more of a clue than Christopher Murphy, US defence spending is likely to rise by between $500bln and $1trln under the new administration. This is no “Get Out of Jail Free” card for NATOs parsimonious majority, Europe will be pressured to defence spending at a time when budgets are already uncomfortably bloated. They have had more than a decade to comply with the Riga commitment.

Looking at the bigger picture for a moment, this sudden rise in spending is a small uptick in a downward trend. Defence budgets have been falling in all the major NATO countries, as the chart below indicates. In 1989 excluding the UK and US the average budget to GDP across NATO countries was 2.9% by 1998 it had fallen to 2% but since then it has steadily declined to an average of 1.4% today. This may be good from an economic perspective – as Frederic Bastiat argued most eloquently in relation to the cost of a standing army in his essay What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen:-

A hundred thousand men, costing the taxpayers a hundred million francs, live as well and provide as good a living for their suppliers as a hundred million francs will allow: that is what is seen.

But a hundred million francs, coming from the pockets of the taxpayers, ceases to provide a living for these taxpayers and their suppliers, to the extent of a hundred million francs: that is what is not seen. Calculate, figure, and tell me where there is any profit for the mass of the people.

Nonetheless, the economic burden of defence spending borne by the US is undoubtedly going to shift, or else, NATO will cease to be tenable going forward:-

defence_spending_as_a_pecentage_of_gdp_since_1949_

Source: SIPRI

Conclusion

I believe it is likely that Germany, France, Italy and Spain will find an additional $64bln/annum for Defence and Aid budgets. They may also have to pick up part of the bill for the smaller countries to their East.

Will this impact European bond markets? It seems like a drop in the ocean beside the Asset Purchase Program of the ECB. President Draghi announced in January that they will be reducing the monthly purchases from Eur 80bln per month to Eur 60bln starting in April. I suspect the impact will be limited but it might prolong the Asset Purchase Program somewhat.

The implications for defence contractors and their stock market valuations will be more direct. Here are some of the largest listed names in Europe. Not all of them have been darlings of the stock market of late:-

areospace_and_defence_companies-1

Source: Investing.com, LSE, NYSE Euronext

For those who, like myself, who prefer to analyse the sector rather than individual stocks, the STOXX Europe TMI Aerospace & Defense (SXPARO) may appeal; here is a three year chart:-

stoxx_-_europe_tmi_aerospace_defense

Source: STOXX

The combination of increased military spending by the US and the pressure being brought to bear on Europe, should see the defence sector outperform over the longer term. During the last 12 months the SXPARO has risen 15%. Its US equivalent, the iShares US Aerospace & Defense ETF (ITA) is up by 20% over the same period, whilst the Euro has declined by around 3% against the US$. As a general rule I prefer to buy Leaders rather than Laggards, but the logic of buying European if European governments are forced to honour their defence obligations remains compelling.

The impact of household debt and saving on long run GDP growth

The impact of household debt and saving on long run GDP growth

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Macro Letter – No 70 – 10-02-2017

The impact of household debt and saving on long run GDP growth

Neither a borrower nor a lender be;

For loan oft loses both itself and friend,

And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.

Hamlet I, iii – Shakespeare

  • BIS research indicates that household debt to GDP ratios above 80% reduce growth
  • But higher household savings do not appear to lead to higher investment
  • Counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus and fractional reserve lending are much more powerful growth factors than household savings or even household debt

Last week saw the publication of a fascinating working paper by the BIS – The real effects of household debt in the short and long run –the conclusions of the authors were most illuminating, here is the abstract:-

Household debt levels relative to GDP have risen rapidly in many countries over the past decade. We investigate the macroeconomic impact of such increases by employing a novel estimation technique proposed by Chudik et al (2016), which tackles the problem of endogeneity present in traditional regressions. Using data on 54 economies over 1990‒2015, we show that household debt boosts consumption and GDP growth in the short run, mostly within one year. By contrast, a 1 percentage point increase in the household debt-to-GDP ratio tends to lower growth in the long run by 0.1 percentage point. Our results suggest that the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify as the household debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 60%. For GDP growth, that intensification seems to occur when the ratio exceeds 80%. Finally, we find that the degree of legal protection of creditors is able to account for the cross-country variation in the long-run impact.

The chart below shows the growing divergence between the household debt of developed and emerging market economies:-

household_debt_-_bis

Source: BIS

Of the emerging markets, South Korea has the highest household debt ratio, followed by Thailand, Malaysia and Hong Kong: all have ratios above 60%. Singapore is on the cusp of this watershed, whilst all the remaining emerging economies boast lower ratios.

Part of the reason for lower household debt in emerging economies is the collective market memory of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Another factor is the higher savings rate among many emerging economies. The table below is incomplete, the data has been gathered from multiple sources and over differing time periods, but it is still quite instructive. It is ranked by highest household savings rate as a percentage of GDP. On this basis, I remain bullish on the prospects for growth in the Philippines and Indonesia, but also in India and Vietnam, notwithstanding the Indian Government debt to GDP ratio of 69% and Vietnam’s budget deficit of -5.4% of GDP:-

em_household_debt_table

There are other countries who household sector also looks robust: China and Russia, are of note.

Last month I wrote about The Risks and Rewards of Asian Real Estate. This BIS report offers an additional guide to valuation. It helps in the assessment of which emerging markets are more likely to weather the impact of de-globalising headwinds. Policy reversals, such as the scrapping of the TPP trade deal, and other developments connected to Trump’s “America First” initiative, spring to mind.

Savings and Investment

When attempting to forecast economic growth, household debt is one factor, but, according to the economics textbooks, household savings are another. Intuitively savings should support investment, however, in a recent article for Evonomics – Does Saving Cause Lending Cause Investment? (No.)Steve Roth shows clear empirical evidence that a higher savings rate does not lead to a higher rate of investment. Here is a chart from the St Louis Federal Reserve which supports Roth’s assertions:-

household_savings_fred

Source: St Louis Federal Reserve Bank

Personal savings represents a small fraction of GDP especially when compared to lending and investment. Roth goes on to analyse the correlations:-

correlations-saving-and-investment-steve-roth-evonomics

His assessment is as follows:-

Of course, correlation doesn’t demonstrate causation. But lack of correlation, and especially negative correlation, does much to disprove causation. What kind of disproofs do we see here?

Personal saving and commercial lending seem to be lightly correlated. The correlation declines over the course of a year, but then increases two or three years out. It’s an odd pattern, with a lot of possible causal stories that might explain it.

Personal saving and private investment (including both residential and business investment) are very weakly correlated, and what correlation there is is mostly negative. More saving correlates with less investment.

Commercial lending has medium-strong correlation with private investment in the short term, declining rapidly over time. This is not terribly surprising. But it has nothing to do with private saving.

Perhaps the most telling result here: Personal saving has a significant and quite consistent negative correlation with business investment. Again: more saving, less investment. This directly contradicts what you learned in Econ 101.

The last line — commercial lending versus business investment — is most interesting compared to line 3 (CommLending vs PrivInv). Changes in commercial lending seem to have their strongest short-term effects on residential investment, not business investment. But its effect on business investment seems more consistent and longer-term.

This is a fascinating insight, however, there are international factors at work here. This data looks at the US, but the US is a far from closed economy; the current account deficit tells you that. Setting aside cross border capital flows there are even larger forces to consider.

Firstly, in general, when an economy slows, its government increases fiscal spending and its central bank reduces interest rates. Secondly, when short term interest rates fall, banks are incentivised to borrow short and lend long. They achieve this using a fraction of their own capital, lending depositors’ money at longer maturity and profiting from the interest rate differential.

Once fiscal stimulus has run its course and banks have leveraged their reserves to the maximum, the importance of household savings should, in theory, become more pronounced, but if interest rates are low investors are likely to defer investment. If government fiscal pump-priming has failed to deliver an economic recovery, investors are likely to be dissuaded from investing. Despite Roth’s empirical evidence to the contrary, I do not believe that the household savings rate is an unimportant measure to consider when forecasting economic growth, merely that it is overshadowed by other factors.

Conclusion

Household savings may have little impact on GDP growth but Household debt does. In the UK the savings Ratio was 6.6%, whilst the Household debt to income ratio was 152% at the end of 2015. By comparison, at the end of 2014 the US the savings ratio was 5% and household debt to income a more modest 113%. The ratio of the ratios is broadly similar at around 23 times.

With interest rates still close to the lowest levels in centuries and real interest rates, even lower, debt, rather than savings, is likely to be the principal driver of investment. That investment is likely to be channelled towards assets which can be collateralised, real estate being an obvious candidate.

I began this letter with a quote from Hamlet. I wonder what advice Polonius would give his son today? The incentive to borrow has seldom been more pronounced.

The Risks and Rewards of Asian Real Estate

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Macro Letter – No 69 – 27-01-2017

The Risks and Rewards of Asian Real Estate

  • Shanghai house prices increased 26.5% in 2016
  • International investment in Asian Real Estate is forecast to grow 64% by 2020
  • Chinese and Indian Real Estate has underperformed US stocks since 2009
  • Economic and demographic growth is supportive Real Estate in several Asian countries

Donald Trump may have torn up the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, but the economic fortunes of Asia are unlikely to be severely dented. This week Blackstone Group – which at $102bln AUM is one of the largest Real Estate investors in the world – announced that they intend to raise $5bln for a second Asian Real Estate fund. Their first $5bln fund – Blackstone Real Estate Partners (BREP) Asia – which launched in 2014, is now 70% invested and generated a 17% return through September 2016. Blackstone’s new vehicle is expected to invest over the next 12 to 18 months across assets such as warehouses and shopping malls in China, India, South-East Asia and Australia.

Last year 22 Asia-focused property funds raised a total of $10.6bln. Recent research by Preqin estimates that $33bln of cash is currently waiting to be allocated by existing Real Estate managers.

Blackrock, which has $21bln in Real Estate assets, predicts the amount invested in Real Estate assets will grow by 75% in the five years to 2020. In their March 2016 Global Real Estate Review they estimated that Global REITs returned 10% over five years, 6% over 10 years and 11% over 15 years.

This year – following the lead of countries such as Australia, Japan and Singapore – India is due to introduce Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) they also plan to permit infrastructure investment trusts (InvITs). Other Asian markets have introduced REITs but not many have been successful in achieving adequate liquidity. India, however, has the seventh highest home ownership rate in the world (86.6%) which bodes well for potential REIT investment demand.

UK asset manager M&G, make an excellent case for Asian Real Estate, emphasis mine:-

Exposure to a diversified and maturing region which accounts for a third of the world’s economic output and offers a sustainable growth premium over the US and Europe.

Diversification benefits. An allocation to Asian real estate boosts risk-adjusted returns as part of a global property portfolio; plus there are diverse opportunities within Asia itself.

Defensive characteristics, with underlying occupier demand supported by robust economic fundamentals, as showcased by Asia’s resilience during the European and US downturns of the recent financial crisis.

What M&G omit to mention is that investing in Real Estate is unlike investing in stocks (Companies can change and evolve) or Bonds which exhibit significant homogeneity – Real Estate might be termed the ultimate Fixed AssetLocation is a critical part of any investment decision. Mark Twain may have said, “Buy land. They’re not making it anymore.” but unless the land has commercial utility it is technically worthless.

The most developed regions of Asia, such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Australia, offer similar transparency to North America and Europe. They will also benefit from the growth of emerging Asian economies together with the expansion of their own domestic middle-income population. However, some of these markets, such as China, have witnessed multi-year price increases. Where is the long-term value and how great is the risk of contagion, should the US and Europe suffer another economic crisis?

In 2013 the IMF estimated that the Asia-Pacific Region accounted for approximately 30% of global GDP, by this juncture the region’s Real Estate assets had reached $4.2trln, nearly one third of the global total. During the past decade the average GDP growth of the region has been 7.4% – more than twice the rate of the US or Europe.

The problem for investors in Asia-Pacific Real Estate is the heavy weighting, especially for REIT investors, to markets which are more highly correlated to global equity markets. The MSCI AC Asia Pacific Real Estate Index, for example, is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that consists of large and mid-cap equity across five Developed Markets (Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore) and eight Emerging Markets (China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand) however, the percentage weighting is heavily skewed to developed markets:-

Country Weight
Japan 32.94%
Hong Kong 26.40%
Australia 19.81%
China 9.62%
Singapore 6.30%
Other 4.93%

Source: MSCI

Here is how the Index performed relative to the boarder Asia-Pacific Equity Index and  ACWI, which is a close proxy for the MSCI World Index:-

msci_asian_real_estate_etf

Source: MSCI

 

The MSCI Real-Estate Index has outperformed since 2002 but it is more volatile and yet closely correlated to the Asia-Pacific Equity or the ACWI. The 2008-2009 decline was particularly brutal.

Under what conditions will Real Estate investments perform?

  • There are several supply and demand factors which drive Real Estate returns, this list is not exhaustive:-
  • Population growth – this may be due to internal demographic trends, such as higher birth rates, a rising working age population, inward migration or urbanisation.
  • Geographic constraints – lack of space drives prices higher.
  • Planning restrictions – limitations on development and redevelopment drive prices higher.
  • Economic growth – this can be at the country level or on a per-capita basis.
  • Economic policy – fiscal stimulus, in the form of infrastructure development, drives economic opportunity which in turn drives demand.
  • Monetary policy – interest rates – especially real-interest rates – and credit controls, drive demand: although supply may follow.
  • Taxation policy – transaction taxes directly impact liquidity – a decline in liquidity is detrimental to prices. Annual duties based on assessable value, directly reduce returns.
  • Legal framework – uncertain security of tenure and risk of curtailment or confiscation, reduces demand and prices.

The markets and countries which will offer lasting diversification benefits are those which exhibit strong economic growth and have low existing international investment in their Real Estate markets. The UN predicts that 380mln people will migrate to cities around the world in the next five years – 95mln in China alone. It is these metropoles, in growing economies, which should be the focus of investment. Since 1990, an estimated 470 new cities have been established in Asia, of which 393 were in China and India.

In their January 2017 update, the IMF – World Economic Outlook growth forecasts for Asian economies have been revised downwards, except for China:-

Country/Region 2017 Change
ASEAN* 4.90% -0.20%
India 7.20% -0.40%
China 6.50% 0.40%

*Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam

Source: IMF

The moderation of the Indian forecast is related to the negative consumption shock, induced by cash shortages and payment disruptions, associated with the recent currency note withdrawal. I am indebted to Focus Economics for allowing me to share their consensus forecast for February 2017. It is slightly lower for China (6.4%) and slightly higher for India (7.4%) suggesting that Indian growth will be less curtailed.

China and India

Research by Knight Frank and Sumitomo Mitsui from early 2016, indicates that the Prime Yield on Real Estate in Bengaluru was 10.5%, in Mumbai, 10% and 9.5% in Delhi. With lower official interest rates in China, yields in Beijing and Shanghai were a less tempting 6.3%. These yields remain attractive when compared to London and New York at 4%, Tokyo at 3.7% and Hong Kong 2.9%. They are also well above the rental yields for the broader residential Real Estate market – India 3.10% and China 3.20%: it’s yet another case of Location, Location, Location.

This brings us to three other risk factors which are especially pertinent for the international Real Estate investor: currency movements, capital flows and the correlation to US stocks.

Since the Chinese currency became tradable in the 1990’s it has been closely pegged to the value of the US$. After 2006 the currency was permitted to rise from USDCNY 8.3 to reach USDCNY 6.04 in 2014. Since then the direction of the Chinese currency has reversed, declining by around 15%.

This recent currency depreciation may be connected to the reversal in capital flows since Q4, 2014. Between 2000 and 2014 China saw $3.6trln of inflows, around 60% of which was Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Since 2014 these flows have reversed, but the rate of outflow has been modest; the trickle may become a spate, if the new US administration continues to shoot from the hip. A move back to USDCNY 8.3 is not inconceivable:-

usdcny-1994-2017

Source: Trading Economics

Chinese inflation has averaged 3.86% since 1994, but since the GFC it has moderated to an annualised 2.38%.

The Indian Rupee, which has been freely exchangeable since 1993, has been considerably more volatile: and more inclined to decline. The chart below covers the period since January 2007:-

usdinr-10-yr

Source: Trading Economics

Since 1993 Indian inflation has averaged 7.29%, but since 2008 it has picked up to 8.65%. The sharp currency depreciation in 2013 saw inflation spike to nearly 11% – last year it averaged 5.22% helped, by declining oil prices. Official rates, which hit 8% in 2014, are back to 6.25%, bond yields have fallen in their wake. Barring an external shock, Indian inflation should trend lower.

Capital flows have had a more dramatic impact on India than China, due to the absence of Indian exchange controls. A February 2016 working paper from the World Bank – Capital Flows and Central Banking – The Indian Experience concludes:-

Going forward, under the new inflation targeting framework, monetary policy will likely respond even more than before to meet the inflation target and adjust less than before to the capital flow cycles. One concern some people have with the move of a developing country such as India to inflation targeting is that it could result in greater exchange rate flexibility. Having liberalized the capital account progressively over the last two and a half decades, the scope to use capital flow measures countercyclically has perhaps diminished as well.

Thus in years ahead, reserve management and macroprudential measures are likely to play a more significant role in helping respond to capital flow cycles, just as the policy makers and the economy develop greater tolerance for exchange rate adjustments.

The surge and sudden stop nature of international capital flows, to and from India, are likely to continue; the most recent episode (2013) is sobering – the Rupee declined by 28% against the US$ in just four months, between May and August. The Sensex Stock Index fell 10.3% over the same period. The stock Index subsequently rallied 72%, making a new all-time high in March 2015. Since March 2015 the Rupee has weakened by a further 10.3% versus the US$ and the stock market has declined by 7.7% – although the Sensex was considerably lower during the Emerging Market rout of Q1, 2016.

Stock market correlations are the next factor to investigate. The three year correlation between the S&P500 and China is 0.37 whilst for India it is 0.60. Since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) however, the IMF has observed a marked increase in synchronicity between Asian markets and China. The IMF WP16/173 – China’s Growing Influence on Asian Financial Markets is insightful, the table below shows the rising correlation seen in Asian equity and bond markets:-

imf_china_correlation_rising_-_march_2016

Source: IMF

With so many variables, the best way to look at the relative merits, of China versus India and Real Estate versus Equities, is by translating their returns into US$. Since the GFC stock market low in March 2009, returns in US$ have been as follows. I have added the current dividend and residential rental yield:-

Index Performance – March 09 – December 16 Performance in US$ Current Yield
S&P500 207% 207% 2%
FHFA House Price Index (US) 9.70% 9.70% 2.20%
Shanghai Composite (China) 50% 49.20% 4.20%
Shanghai Second Hand House Price Index 74% 72.85% 3.20%
S&P BSE Sensex (India) 204% 135.25% 1.50%
National Housing Bank Index (India) 58%* 38.45% 3.10%
*Data to end Q1 2016

Source: Investing.com, FHFA, eHomeday, National Housing Bank, Global Property Guide

There are a number of weaknesses with this analysis. Firstly, it does not include reinvested income from dividends or rent – whilst the current yields are deceptively low. Data for the S&P500 suggests reinvested dividend income would have added a further 40% to the return over this period, however, I have been unable to obtain reliable data for the other markets. Secondly, the rental yield data is for residential property. You will note that Frank Knight estimate Prime Yields for Bengaluru at 10.5%, 10% for Mumbai and 9.5% for Delhi. Prime Yields in Beijing and Shanghai offer the investor 6.3% – Location, Location, Location.

The chart below shows the evolution of the Shanghai Second Hand House Price Index since 2003:-

china_-_ehomeday_-_shanghai_second_hand_house_pric

Source: eHomeday, Global Property Guide

For comparison here is the National Housing Bank Index since 2007:-

india_-_national_housing_bank_-_house_price_index

Source: National Housing Bank, Global Property Guide

Finally, for global comparison, this is the FHFA – House Price Index going back to 1991:-

us_-_federal_housing_finance_agency_-_house_price_

Source: FHFA, Global Property Guide

The Rest of Asia

In this Letter I have focused on China and India, but this article is about Asian Real Estate. The 2004-2014 annual return on Real Estate investment in Hong Kong was 14.4% – the market may have cooled but demand remains. Singapore has delivered 11.7% per annum over the same period. Cities such as Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok remain attractive. Vietnam, with a GDP forecast of 6.6% for 2017 and favourable demographics, offers significant potential – Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh are the cities on which to focus. Indonesia and the Philippines also offer economic and demographic potential, Jakarta and Manilla having obvious appeal. The table below, sorted by the Mortgage to Income ratio, compares the valuation for residential property and economic growth across the region:-

Country Price/Income Ratio Rental Yield City Price/Rent Ratio City Mortgage As % of Income GDP f/c 2017
Malaysia 9.53 4.07 24.6 72.87 4%
Taiwan 12.87 1.54 64.91 78.76 1.80%
South Korea 12.38 2.04 49.1 85.47 2.40%
India 10.28 3.08 32.44 123.44 7.40%
Singapore 21.63 2.75 36.41 134.33 1.60%
Pakistan 12.09 4.08 24.51 156.97 5.10%
Philippines 16.91 3.75 26.69 162.87 6.60%
Bangladesh 12.89 3.25 30.81 181.3 6.80%
China 23.29 2.23 44.83 189.71 6.40%
Mongolia 15.77 9.78 10.22 203.47 1.80%
Thailand 24.43 3.8 26.29 212.03 3.30%
Hong Kong 36.15 2.25 44.35 224.85 1.80%
Sri Lanka 17.49 4.91 20.38 238.64 4.80%
Indonesia 21.03 4.67 21.41 247.68 5.10%
Vietnam 26.76 4.52 22.1 285.55 6.60%
Cambodia 24.32 7.44 13.44 292.43 7%

Source: Numbeo, Focus Economics, Trading Economics

There are opportunities and contradictions which make it difficult to draw investment conclusions from the table above: and this is just a country by country analysis.

Conclusions and Investment Opportunities

Real Estate, more so than any of the other major asset classes, is individual asset specific. Since we are looking for diversification we need to evaluate the two types of collective vehicle available to the investor.

Investing via REITs exposes you to the volatility of the stock market as well as the underlying asset. Investing directly via unlisted funds has been the preferred choice of pension fund managers in the UK for many years. There are pros and cons to this approach, but, for diversification, this is likely to be the less correlated strategy. Make sure, however, that you understand the liquidity constraints, not just of the fund, but also of the constituents of the portfolio. The GFC was, in particular, a crisis of liquidity: and property is not a liquid investment.

Unsurprisingly Norway’s $894bln Sovereign Wealth Fund – Norges Bank Investment Management – invests in Real Estate for the long run. This is how they describe their approach to the asset class, emphasis mine:-

The fund invests for future generations. It has no short term liabilities and is not subject to rules that could require costly adjustments at inopportune times.

…Our goal is to build a global, but concentrated, real estate portfolio…The strategy is to invest in a limited number of major cities in key markets.

According to Institutional Real Estate Inc. the largest investment managers in the Asia-Pacific Region at 31st December 2014 were. I’m sure they will be happy to take your call:-

Investment Manager Asian AUM $Blns Total AUM $Blns
UBS Global Asset Management 9.33 64.89
Global Logistic Properties 9.26 20.14
CBRE Global Investors 8.56 91.27
LaSalle Investment Management 8.05 55.75
Blackstone Group 7.58 121.88
Alpha Investment Partners 7.48 8.70
Blackrock 7.32 22.92
Pramerica Real Estate Investors 6.84 59.17
Gaw Capital Partners 6.64 9.16
Prologis 6.08 29.98

Source: Institutional Real Estate Inc.

In their August 2016 H2, 2016 Outlook, UBS Global Asset Management made the following observations:-

Although property yields across the APAC region are at, or close to, historical lows, demand for real estate exposure in a multi-asset context is set to remain healthy in the near-to-medium term. Capital inflows into the asset class will continue to be supported by broad structural shifts across the region related to demographics and demand for income producing assets on the one hand, and (ex-ante) excess supply of private (household and/or corporate) sector savings on the other. Part of this excess savings will continue to find its way into real estate, both in APAC and in other regions…

Real Estate investment in Asia offers opportunity in the long run, but for markets such as Shanghai (+26.5% in 2016) the next year may see a return from the ether. India, by contrast, has stronger growth, stronger demographics, higher interest rates and an already weak currency. The currency may not offer protection, inflation is still relatively high and the Rupee has been falling for decades – nonetheless, Indian cities offer a compelling growth story for Real Estate investors. Other developing Asian countries may perform better still but they are likely to be less liquid and less transparent. The developed countries of the region offer greater transparency and liquidity but their returns are likely to be lower. A specialist portfolio manager offers the best solution for most investors – that’s assuming you’re not a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

Equity valuation in a de-globalising world

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Macro Letter – No 68 – 13-01-2017

Equity valuation in a de-globalising world

  • The Federal Reserve will raise rates in the coming year
  • The positive Yield Gap will vanish but equity markets should still rise
  • After an eight year bull market equities are vulnerable to negative shocks
  • A value based investment approach is to be favoured even in the current environment

In this Macro Letter I review stock market valuation. I conclude with some general recommendations but the main purpose of my letter is to investigate different methods of valuation and consider the benefits and dangers of diversification. I begin by looking at the US market and the prospects for the US economy. Then I turn to global equity markets, where I consider the benefits and perils of diversification into Frontier stocks. I go on to review global industry sectors, before returning to examine the long term value to be found in developed markets. I finish by looking at the recent outperformance of Value versus Growth.

US Stocks and the Yield Gap

The Equity bull market is entering its eighth year and for US stocks this is the second longest bull-market since WWII – the longest being, between 1987 and 2000. The current bull-market has differed from the 1987-2000 period in that interest rates have fallen throughout the period. Bond yields have also declined to historically low levels. The Yield Gap – the premium of dividend yields over bond yields – which had been inverted since the mid-1950’s, turned positive once more. The chart below shows the yield of the S&P500 and 10yr T-Bonds since 1900:-

yield-gap-in-a-longer-term-context-jpeg

Source: Reuters

What this chart shows most clearly is that the return to a positive Yield Gap has been a function of falling bond yields rather than any substantial rise in dividend pay-out.

The chart below looks at the relationships between the Yield Gap and the real return on US 10yr Treasuries and S&P500 dividends since 1930 – I have used the Implicit Price Deflator as the measure of inflation:-

us_yield_gap_-_real_bond_yld_-_real_div_yld

Source: Multpl, St Louis Federal Reserve

The decline in the real dividend yield was a response to rising inflation from the late 1950’s onwards. The return to a positive Yield Gap has been a recent phenomenon. The average Yield Gap since 1900 is -0.51%, since 1930 it has been -1.17%. It has been below its long-run average at -0.37% since 2008. The executive officers of US corporations will continue to favour share buy-backs over increased dividends – I do not expect dividend yields to keep pace with any pick-up in inflation in the near-term, but, share buy-backs will continue to support stocks in general.

S&P 500 forecasts for 2017

What does this mean for the return on the S&P 500 in 2017? According to Bloomberg, the consensus forecast is for a rise of 4% but the range of forecasts is a rather narrow +1.3% to +8.3%. As at the close on 11th January we were already up 1.6% from the 30th December close.

Corporate earnings continue to rise although the pace of increase has moderated. Factset Earning Insight – January 6th – makes the following observations:-

Earnings Growth: For Q4 2016, the estimated earnings growth rate for the S&P 500 is 3.0%. If the index reports earnings growth for Q4, it will mark the first time the index has seen year-over-year growth in earnings for two consecutive quarters since Q4 2014 and Q1 2015.

Earnings Revisions: On September 30, the estimated earnings growth rate for Q4 2016 was 5.2%. Ten of the eleven sectors have lower growth rates today (compared to September 30) due to downward revisions to earnings estimates, led by the Materials sector.

Earnings Guidance: For Q4 2016, 77 S&P 500 companies have issued negative EPS guidance and 34 S&P 500 companies have issued positive EPS guidance.

Valuation: The forward 12-month P/E ratio for the S&P 500 is 17.1. This P/E ratio is above the 5-year average (15.1) and the 10-year average (14.4).

Earnings Scorecard: As of today (with 4% of the companies in the S&P 500 reporting actual results for Q4 2016), 73% of S&P 500 companies have beat the mean EPS estimate and 36% of S&P 500 companies have beat the mean sales estimate.

…For Q1 2017, analysts are projecting earnings growth of 11.0% and revenue growth of 7.9%.

For Q2 2017, analysts are projecting earnings growth of 10.5% and revenue growth of 6.0%.

For all of 2017, analysts are projecting earnings growth of 11.5% and revenue growth of 5.9%.

…At the sector level, the Energy (33.2) sector has the highest forward 12-month P/E ratio, while the Telecom Services (14.2) and Financials (14.2) sectors have the lowest forward 12-month P/E ratios. Nine sectors have forward 12-month P/E ratios that are above their 10-year averages, led by the Energy (33.2 vs. 17.9) sector. One sector (Telecom Services) has a forward 12-month P/E ratio that is below the 10-year average (14.2 vs. 14.6).

Other indicators, which should be supportive for the US economy, include the ISM – PMI Index which is closely correlated to the business cycle. It came in at 54. 7 the highest since November 2014. Here is a 10 year chart:-

united-states-business-confidence-10yr

Source: Trading Economics, Institute for Supply Management

A shorter-term indicator for the US economy is the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index – CESI. The chart below suggests that the surprise caused by Trump’s presidential victory is still gathering momentum:-

citi_cesi_index_-_january_2017_-_yardeni

Source: Yardeni, Citigroup

With both the ISM and the CESI indices rising, even the most bearish of macro-economist is likely to be “sceptically positive” on the US economy and this should be supportive for the US stock market.

Global Stocks

I have focussed on the US stock market because of the close correlation between the US and other major stock markets around the world.

As the world becomes less globalised, or as one moves away from the major stock markets, the diversification benefits of a global portfolio, such as the one Andrew Craig describes in his book “How to Own the World”, becomes more enticing. Andrew recommends diversification by asset class, but even a diversified equity portfolio – without the addition of bonds, commodities, real-estate and infrastructure – can offer an enhanced Sharpe Ratio. The table below looks at the three year monthly correlations of emerging and frontier stock markets with a correlation of less than 0.40 to the US market:-

Country Correlations < 0.40 to US stocks – 36 months
Malawi -0.12
Iraq -0.12
Panama -0.01
Cambodia 0.00
Rwanda 0.01
Venezuela 0.01
Uganda 0.01
Trinidad and Tobago 0.02
Tunisia 0.02
Botswana 0.07
Mauritius 0.07
Tanzania 0.08
Palestine 0.09
Laos 0.09
Ghana 0.10
Zambia 0.10
Peru 0.11
Bahrain 0.13
Jordan 0.15
Cote D’Ivoire 0.15
Sri Lanka 0.16
Argentina 0.17
Nigeria 0.17
Qatar 0.21
Kenya 0.21
Pakistan 0.24
Jamaica 0.24
Oman 0.25
Colombia 0.27
Saudi Arabia 0.31
Kuwait 0.36
China 0.37
Bermuda 0.38
Egypt 0.38
Vietnam 0.39

Source: Investment Frontier

Many of these stock markets are illiquid or suffer from investment restrictions: but here you will find some of the fastest growing economies in the world. These correlations look beguilingly low but remember that during broad-based market declines short-term correlations tend to rise – the illusory nature of liquidity drives this process. The price of a financial asset is driven by investment flows, cognitive behavioural biases drive investment decisions. Herd instinct rises dramatically when fear replaces greed.

Industry Sectors

The major stock markets also offer opportunities. Looking globally by industry sector there are some attractive longer-term value propositions. The table below ranks the major markets by sector as at 30th December 2016. The sectors have been sorted by trailing P/E ratio (mining and alternative energy P/E data is absent but by other measures mining is relatively cheap):-

Industry Sector PE PC PB PS DY
Real Est Serv 11.2 14.9 1 2.2 2.70%
Auto 12.1 5.7 1.4 0.6 2.50%
Banks 13.8 9.6 1.1 3.30%
Life Insur 14.2 6.4 1.1 0.7 3.00%
Electricity 14.9 5.6 1.3 1.1 4.00%
Forest & Paper 15.1 7.1 1.6 0.9 2.90%
Nonlife Ins 16.2 10.4 1.3 1 2.40%
Financial Serv 16.7 13.8 1.8 2.3 2.20%
Telecom (fxd) 17.5 5.5 2.3 1.4 4.20%
Travel & Leisure 17.6 9.1 2.9 1.4 2.10%
Tech HW & Equ 18.3 10.7 3 1.8 2.30%
Chemicals 18.8 10.1 2.4 1.3 2.60%
Household Gds 18.8 15 2.8 1.7 2.40%
Gen Ind 19 11.3 1.9 1.1 2.40%
REITs 20.4 16.7 1.7 7.7 4.50%
Construction 20.9 11.4 1.9 0.9 2.10%
Telecom (mob) 21.4 5.6 1.9 1.5 3.30%
Tobacco 21.5 21.1 9.8 4.9 3.60%
Media 21.6 10.9 2.9 2 2.10%
Food Retail 21.6 10.2 2.8 0.4 2.00%
Eltro & Elect Equ 21.7 12.2 2.2 1 1.70%
Pharma & Bio 22.4 16.3 3.4 3.5 2.30%
Food Prod 23.2 14.3 2.6 1.2 2.20%
Healthcare 23.7 13.1 3.2 1.4 1.10%
Leisure Gds 23.9 8.4 2 1.1 1.20%
Inds Transport 23.9 10.4 2.5 1.3 2.50%
Aero & Def 23.9 14.9 5 1.3 2.10%
Inds Eng 24.6 12.4 2.5 1.1 2.00%
Personal Gds 24.7 16.8 4.3 2 2.00%
Gen Retail 25.8 14 4.2 1 1.70%
Support Serv 26.4 11.9 2.8 1.1 1.90%
Beverages 27 14.9 4.2 2.4 2.70%
SW & Comp Serv 27.3 15.9 4.5 3.8 1.10%
Oil Service 73.9 11.8 1.9 1.7 3.70%
Oil&Gas Prod 116.9 8.2 1.4 1 3.10%
Inds Metal 165.7 7.7 1.1 0.7 2.40%
Mining 8.9 1.6 1.5 1.90%
Alt Energy 10.5 1.7 0.9 1.20%

Source: Star Capital

A number of sectors have been out of favour since 2008 and may remain so in 2017 but it is useful to know where under-performance can be found.

Developed Market Opportunities

At a country level there is better long-term valuation to be found outside the US, even among the developed countries. Here is Star Capital’s 10 to 15 year total annual return forecast for the major markets and regions:-

Country CAPE Forecast PB Forecast ø Forecast
Italy 12.7 9.10% 1.2 10.40% 9.70%
Spain 11.7 9.70% 1.4 8.80% 9.30%
United Kingdom 14.8 8.00% 1.8 7.20% 7.60%
France 18.3 6.60% 1.6 8.10% 7.30%
Australia 16.8 7.10% 2 6.60% 6.90%
Germany 18.6 6.40% 1.8 7.40% 6.90%
Japan 24.9 4.40% 1.3 9.40% 6.90%
Netherlands 19.8 6.00% 1.8 7.20% 6.60%
Canada 20.5 5.70% 1.9 6.90% 6.30%
Sweden 20.6 5.70% 2.1 6.20% 5.90%
Switzerland 21.5 5.40% 2.4 5.30% 5.30%
United States 26.4 4.00% 2.9 4.10% 4.00%
Emerging Markets 14 8.40% 1.6 7.90% 8.20%
Developed Europe 16.6 7.20% 1.8 7.40% 7.30%
World AC 20.8 5.60% 2 6.70% 6.20%
Developed Markets 21.9 5.30% 2 6.50% 5.90%

Source: Star Capital, Bloomberg, Reuters

I have sorted this data based on Star Capital’s composite annual return forecast. The first three countries, Italy, Spain and the UK, all face uncertainty linked to the future of the EU. Interestingly Switzerland offers better long-term returns than the US – with considerably less currency risk for the international investor.

Value Investing

Since the financial crisis in 2008 through to 2015 Growth stocks outperformed Value stocks. I predict a sea-change. The fathers of Value Investing, Ben Graham and David Dodd first published Securities Analysis in 1934. Towards the end of his career Graham opined (emphasis is mine):-

I am no longer an advocate of elaborate techniques of security analysis in order to find superior value opportunities. This was a rewarding activity, say, 40 years ago, when our textbook “Graham and Dodd” was first published; but the situation has changed a great deal since then. In the old days any well-trained security analyst could do a good professional job of selecting undervalued issues through detailed studies; but in the light of the enormous amount of research now being carried on, I doubt whether in most cases such extensive efforts will generate sufficiently superior selections to justify their cost. To that very limited extent, I’m on the side of the “efficient market” school of thought now generally accepted by the professors.

As we embrace the “Big Data” era, the cost of analysing vast amounts of data will collapse, whilst, at the same time, the amount of available data will grow exponentially. I believe we are at the dawn of a new age for Value Investing where the quantitative analysis of a vast array of qualitative factors will allow investors to defy the Efficient Market Hypothesis, even if we cannot satisfactorily refute Eugene Fama’s premise. In 2016, for the first time in seven years, Value beat Growth across all major categories:-

value_outperformance_of_growth_2016

Source: MSCI, Bloomberg

Value stocks tend to exhibit higher volatility than growth stocks, but volatility is only one aspect of risk: buying Value offers long-term protection, especially during an economic downturn. According to Bloomberg’s Nir Kaissar, Value has consistently underperformed Growth since the financial crisis except in US Small Cap’s – his article – Value Investing Hits Back – is insightful.

Conclusion and Investment Opportunities

When I first began investing in stocks the one of the general rules was to buy when the P/E ratio was below 10 and sell when it rose above 20. Today, of the world’s major stock markets, only Russia and China offer single digit P/Es – low ratios are a structural feature of these markets. I wrote about Russia last month in – Russia – Will the Bear come in from the cold? My conclusion was that one should be cautiously optimistic:-

The Russian stock market has already factored in much of the positive economic and political news. The OPEC deal took shape in a series of well publicised stages. The “Trump Effect” is unlikely to be as significant as some commentators hope. The ending of sanctions is the one factor which could act as a positive price shock, however, the Russian economy has suffered a severe recession and now appears to be recovering of its own accord.

Interest rates in the US will rise, though probably not by as much, nor as quickly as the market is currently betting. A value based approach to stock selection offers greater protection and greater return in the long run.

The US stock market continues to rise. The US economy looks set to grow more rapidly in 2017 due to tax cuts and fiscal stimulus, but, for international companies which export to the US, the threat of protectionism is likely to temper enthusiasm for their stocks.

US financial services firms were a big winner after the Trump election result, they should continue to benefit even as interest rates increase – yield curves will steepen, increasing return on capital. US telecommunications stocks have a performed well since the election along with biotechnology – I have no specific view on these industries. Energy stocks have also rallied, perhaps as much on the OPEC deal as the Trump triumph – many new technologies are starting to be implemented by the energy industry but enthusiasm for these stocks may be tempered by a decline in oil prices once the rig count rebounds. The Baker-Hughes Rig Count ended the year at 525 up from a low of 316 in May. The old high of 1,609 was set back in October 2014 – there is plenty of spare capacity which will exert downward pressure on oil prices.

Indian economic growth will outpace China for another year. Despite a weakening Chinese Yuan, Vietnam remains competitive – it is on the cusp of moving from Frontier to Emerging Market status. Indonesia also looks likely to perform well during 2017, GDP forecasts are around 5%; however, Indonesia’s strong reliance on commodity exports makes it more vulnerable than some of its South and East Asian neighbours.

Protectionism: which countries have room for fiscal expansion?

Protectionism: which countries have room for fiscal expansion?

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Macro Letter – No 66 – 25-11-2016

Protectionism: which countries have room for fiscal expansion?

  • As globalisation goes into reverse, fiscal policy will take the strain
  • Countries with government debt to GDP ratios <70% represent >45% of global GDP
  • Fiscal expansion by less indebted countries could increase total debt by at least $3.48trln

…But now I only hear

Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar…

Matthew Arnold – Dover Beach

Over the course of 2016 the world’s leading central banks have subtly changed their approach to monetary policy. Although they have not stated that QE has failed to stimulate global growth they have begun to pass the baton for stimulating the world economy back to their respective governments.

The US election has brought protectionism and fiscal stimulus back to the centre of economic debate: but many countries are already saddled with uncomfortably high debt to GDP ratios. Which countries have room for manoeuvre and which governments will be forced to contemplate fiscal expansion to offset the headwinds of protectionism?

Anti-globalisation – the melancholy, long, withdrawing roar

The “Elephant” chart below explains, in economic terms, the growing political upheaval which has been evident in many developed countries:-

world-bank-economist-real-income-growth-1988-2008

Source: The Economist, World Bank, Lakner and Milanovic

This chart – or at least the dark blue line – began life in a World Bank working paper in 2012. It shows the global change in real-income, by income percentile, between 1988 and 2008. The Economist – Shooting an elephant provides more information.

What this chart reveals is that people earning between the 70th and 90th percentile have seen considerably less increase in income relative to their poor (and richer) peers. I imagine a similar chart up-dated to 2016 will show an even more pronounced decline in the fortunes of the lower paid workers of G7.

The unforeseen consequence to this incredible achievement – bringing so many of the world’s poor out of absolute poverty – has been to alienate many of the developed world’s poorer paid citizens. They have borne the brunt of globalisation without participating in much, if any, of the benefit.

An additional cause for concern to the lower paid of the developed world is their real-inflation rate. The chart below shows US inflation for specific items between 1996 and 2016:-

pricesnew

Source: American Enterprise Institute

At least the “huddled masses yearning to breathe free” can afford a cheaper television, but this is little comfort when they cannot afford the house to put it in.

Anti-globalisation takes many forms, from simple regulatory protectionism to aspects of the climate-change lobby. These issues, however, are not the subject of this letter.

Which countries will lose out from protectionism?

It is too early to predict whether all the election promises of President-elect Trump will come to pass. He has indicated that he wants to impose a 35% tariff on Mexican and, 45% tariff on Chinese imports, renegotiate NAFTA (which the Peterson Institute estimate to be worth $127bln/annum to the US economy) halt negotiations of the TPP and TTIP and, potentially, withdraw from the WTO.

Looking at the “Elephant” chart above it is clear that, in absolute per capita terms, the world’s poorest individuals have benefitted most from globalisation, but the largest emerging economies have benefitted most in monetary terms.

The table below ranks countries with a GDP in excess of $170bln/annum by their debt to GDP ratios. These countries represent roughly 95% of global GDP. The 10yr bond yields were taken, where I could find them, on 21st November:-

Country GDP Base Rate Inflation Debt to GDP 10yr yield Notes
Japan 4,123 -0.10% -0.50% 229% 0.03
Greece 195 0.00% -0.50% 177% 6.95
Italy 1,815 0.00% -0.20% 133% 2.06
Portugal 199 0.00% 0.90% 129% 3.70
Belgium 454 0.00% 1.81% 106% 0.65
Singapore 293 0.07% -0.20% 105% 2.36
United States 17,947 0.50% 1.60% 104% 2.32
Spain 1,199 0.00% 0.70% 99% 1.60
France 2,422 0.00% 0.40% 96% 0.74
Ireland 238 0.00% -0.30% 94% 0.98
Canada 1,551 0.50% 1.50% 92% 1.57
UK 2,849 0.25% 0.90% 89% 1.41
Austria 374 0.00% 1.30% 86% 0.54
Egypt 331 14.75% 13.60% 85% 16.95
Germany 3,356 0.00% 0.80% 71% 0.27
India 2,074 6.25% 4.20% 67% 6.30
Brazil 1,775 14.00% 7.87% 66% 11.98
Netherlands 753 0.00% 0.40% 65% 0.43
Israel 296 0.10% -0.30% 65% 2.14
Pakistan 270 5.75% 4.21% 65% 8.03
Finland 230 0.00% 0.50% 63% 0.46
Malaysia 296 3.00% 1.50% 54% 4.39
Poland 475 1.50% -0.20% 51% 3.58
Vietnam 194 6.50% 4.09% 51% 6.10
South Africa 313 7.00% 6.10% 50% 8.98
Venezuela 510 21.73% 180.90% 50% 10.57
Argentina 548 25.75% 40.50% 48% 2.99
Philippines 292 3.00% 2.30% 45% 4.40
Thailand 395 1.50% 0.34% 44% 2.68
China 10,866 4.35% 2.10% 44% 2.91
Sweden 493 -0.50% 1.20% 43% 0.52
Mexico 1,144 5.25% 3.06% 43% 7.39
Czech Republic 182 0.05% 0.80% 41% 0.59
Denmark 295 -0.65% 0.30% 40% 0.40
Romania 178 1.75% -0.40% 38% 3.55
Colombia 292 7.75% 6.48% 38% 7.75
Australia 1,340 1.50% 1.30% 37% 2.67
South Korea 1,378 1.25% 1.30% 35% 2.12
Switzerland 665 -0.75% -0.20% 34% -0.15
Turkey 718 7.50% 7.16% 33% 10.77
Hong Kong 310 0.75% 2.70% 32% 1.37
Taiwan 524 1.38% 1.70% 32% 1.41
Norway 388 0.50% 3.70% 32% 1.65
Bangladesh 195 6.75% 5.57% 27% 6.89
Indonesia 862 4.75% 3.31% 27% 7.85
New Zealand 174 1.75% 0.40% 25% 3.11
Kazakhstan 184 12.00% 11.50% 23% 3.82 ***
Peru 192 4.25% 3.41% 23% 6.43
Russia 1,326 10.00% 6.10% 18% 8.71
Chile 240 3.50% 2.80% 18% 4.60
Iran 425 20.00% 9.50% 16% 20.00 **
UAE 370 1.25% 0.60% 16% 3.57 *
Nigeria 481 14.00% 18.30% 12% 15.97
Saudi Arabia 646 2.00% 2.60% 6% 3.97 *

 Notes

*Estimate from recent sovereign issues

**Estimated 1yr bond yield

***Estimated from recent US$ issue

Source: Trading economics, Investing.com, Bangledesh Treasury

Last month in their semi-annual fiscal monitor – Debt: Use It Wisely – the IMF warned that global non-financial debt is now running at $152trln or 225% of global GDP, with the private sector responsible for 66% – a potential source of systemic instability . The table above, however, shows that many governments have room to increase their debt to GDP ratios substantially – which might be of luke-warm comfort should the private sector encounter difficulty. Interest rates, in general, are at historic lows; now is as good a time as any for governments to borrow cheaply.

If countries with government debt/GDP of less than 70% increased their debt by just 20% of GDP, ceteris paribus, this would add $6.65trln to total global debt (4.4%).

Most Favoured Borrowers

Looking more closely at the data – and taking into account budget and current account deficits -there are several governments which are unlikely to be able to increase their levels of debt substantially. Nonetheless, a sizable number of developed and developing nations are in a position to increase debt to offset the headwinds of US protectionism should it arrive.

The table below lists those countries which could reasonably be expected to implement a fiscal response to slower growth:-

Country GDP Debt to GDP 10yr yield Gov. Debt 70% Ratio 90% Ratio 12m fwd PE CAPE Div Yld.
Saudi Arabia 646 6% 3.97 38 452 581 ? ? ?
Chile 240 18% 4.60 42 168 216 15.6 ? ?
New Zealand 174 25% 3.11 43 122 157 19.3 22 4.1%
Peru 192 23% 6.43 44 134 173 12.1 ? ?
Bangladesh 195 27% 6.89 53 137 176 ? ? ?
UAE 370 16% 3.57 58 259 333 ? ? ?
Colombia 292 38% 7.75 111 204 263 ? ? ?
Norway 388 32% 1.65 123 272 349 14.2 11.5 4.3%
Philippines 292 45% 4.40 132 204 263 16.4 22.6 1.6%
Malaysia 296 54% 4.39 160 207 266 15.6 16 3.1%
Taiwan 524 32% 1.41 166 367 472 12.8 19 3.9%
Thailand 395 44% 2.68 175 277 356 13.8 17.7 3.1%
Israel 296 65% 2.14 192 207 266 9.4 14.6 2.8%
Sweden 493 43% 0.52 214 345 444 16.1 19.8 3.6%
Indonesia 862 27% 7.85 233 603 776 14.7 19.6 1.9%
South Korea 1,378 35% 2.12 484 965 1,240 9.6 13.1 1.7%
Australia 1,340 37% 2.67 493 938 1,206 15.6 16.1 4.3%
Mexico 1,144 43% 7.39 494 801 1,030 16.6 22.4 1.9%
India 2,074 67% 6.30 1,394 1,452 1,867 15.9 18.6 1.5%
4,649 8,114 10,432

 Source: Trading economics, Investing.com, Bangledesh Treasury, Star Capital, Yardeni Research

The countries in the table above – which have been ranked, in ascending order, by outstanding government debt – have total debt of $4.65trln. If they each increased their ratios to 70% they could raise an additional $3.47trln to lean against an economic downturn. A 90% ratio would see $5.78trln of new government debt created. This is the level above which economies cease to benefit from additional debt according to  Reinhart and Rogoff in their paper Growth in a Time of Debt.

Whilst this analysis is overly simplistic, the quantum of new issuance is not beyond the realms of possibility – India’s ratio reached 84% in 2003, Indonesia’s, hit 87% in 2000 and Saudi Arabia’s, 103% in 1999. Nonetheless, the level of indebtedness is higher than many countries have needed to entertain in recent years – ratios in Australia, Mexico and South Korea, though relatively low, are all at millennium highs.

Apart from the domestic imperative to maintain economic growth, there will be pressure on these governments to pull their weight from their more corpulent brethren. Looking at the table above, if the top seven countries, by absolute increased issuance, raised their debt/GDP ratios to 90%, this would add $3.87trln to global debt.

Despite US debt to GDP being above 100%, the new US President-elect has promised $5.3trln of fiscal spending during his first term. Whether this is a good idea or not is debated this week by the Peterson Institute – What Size Fiscal Deficits for the United States?

Other large developed nations, including Japan, are likely to resort to further fiscal stimulus in the absence of leeway on monetary policy. For developing and smaller developed nations, the stigma of an excessively high debt to GDP ratio will be assuaged by the company keep.

Conclusions and investment opportunities

Despite recent warnings from the IMF and plentiful academic analysis of the dangers of excessive debt – of which Deleveraging? What Deleveraging? is perhaps the best known – given the way democracy operates, it is most likely that fiscal stimulus will assume the vanguard. Monetary policy will play a supporting role in these endeavours. As I wrote in – Yield Curve Control – the road to infinite QE – I believe the Bank of Japan has already passed the baton.

Infrastructure spending will be at the heart of many of these fiscal programmes. There will be plenty of trophy projects and “pork barrel” largesse, but companies which are active in these sectors of the economy will benefit.

Regional and bilateral trade deals will also become more important. In theory the EU has the scale to negotiate with the US, albeit the progress of the TTIP has stalled. Asean and Mercosur have an opportunity to flex their flaccid muscles. China’s One Belt One Road policy will also gain additional traction if the US embark on policies akin to the isolationism of the Ming Dynasty after the death of Emperor Zheng He in 1433. The trade-vacuum will be filled: and China, despite its malinvestments, remains in the ascendant.

According to FocusEconomics – Economic Snapshot for East & South Asia – East and South Asian growth accelerated for the first time in over two years during Q3, to 6.2%. Despite the economic headwinds of tightening monetary and protectionist trade policy in the US, combined with the very real risk of a slowdown in the Chinese property market, they forecast only a moderate reduction to 6% in Q4. They see that growth rate continuing through the first half of 2017.

Indian bond yields actually fell in the wake of the US election – from 6.83% on 8th to 6.30% by 21st. This is a country with significant internal demand and capital controls which afford it some protection. Its textile industry may even benefit in the near-term from non-ratification of the TPP. Indian stocks, however are not particularly cheap. With a PE 24.3, CAPE 18.6, 12 month forward PE 15.9 the Sensex index is up more than 70% from its December 2011 lows.

Stocks in Israel, Taiwan and Thailand may offer better value. They are the only emerging countries which offer a dividend yield greater than their bond yield. Taiwanese stocks appear inexpensive on a number of other measures too. With East and South Asian growth set to continue, emerging Asia looks most promising.

A US tax cut will stimulate demand more rapidly than the boost from US fiscal spending. Protectionist tariffs may hit Mexico and China rapidly but other measures are likely to be implemented more gradually. As long as the US continues to run a trade deficit it makes sense to remain optimistic about several of the emerging Asian markets listed in the table above.

Yield Curve Control – the road to infinite QE

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Macro Letter – No 65 – 11-11-2016

Yield Curve Control – the road to infinite QE

  • The BoJ unveiled their latest unconventional monetary policy on 21st September
  • In order to target 10 year yields QE must be capable of being infinite
  • Infinite Japanese government borrowing at zero cost will eventually prove inflationary
  • The financial markets have yet to test the BoJ’s resolve but they will

Zero Yield 10 year

Ever since central banks embarked on quantitative easing (QE) they were effectively taking control of their domestic government yield curves. Of course this was de facto. Now, in Japan, it has finally been declared de jure since the Bank of Japan (BoJ) announced the (not so) new policy of “Yield Curve Control”.  New Framework for Strengthening Monetary Easing: “Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing with Yield Curve Control”, published on 21st September, is a tacit admission that BoJ intervention in the Japanese Government Bond market (JGB) is effectively unlimited.  This is how they described it (the emphasis is mine):-

The Bank will purchase Japanese government bonds (JGBs) so that 10-year JGB yields will remain more or less at the current level (around zero percent). With regard to the amount of JGBs to be purchased, the Bank will conduct purchases more or less in line with the current pace — an annual pace of increase in the amount outstanding of its JGB holdings at about 80 trillion yen — aiming to achieve the target level of a long-term interest rate specified by the guideline. JGBs with a wide range of maturities will continue to be eligible for purchase…

By the end of September 2016 the BoJ owned JPY 340.9trln (39.9%) of outstanding JGB issuance – they cannot claim to conduct purchases “more of less in line with the current pace” and maintain a target 10 year yield. Either they will fail to maintain the 10 year yield target in order to maintain their purchase target of JPY 80trln/annum or they will forsake their purchase target in order to maintain the 10 year yield target. Either they are admitting that the current policy of the BoJ (and other central banks which have embraced quantitative easing) is a limited form of “Yield Curve Control” or they are announcing a sea-change to an environment where the target yield will take precedence. If it is to be the latter, infinite QE is implied even if it is not stated for the record.

Zero Coupon Perpetuals

I believe the 21st September announcement is a sea-change. My concern is how the BoJ can ever hope to unwind the QE. One suggestion coming from commentators but definitely not from the BoJ, which gained credence in April – and again, after Ben Bernanke’s visit to Tokyo in July – is that the Japanese government should issue Zero Coupon Perpetual bonds.  Zero-coupon bonds are not a joke – 28th August – by Edward Chancellor discusses the subject:-

Bernanke’s latest bright idea is that the Bank of Japan, which has bought up close to half the country’s outstanding government debt, should convert its bond holdings into zero-coupon perpetual securities – that is, financial instruments with no intrinsic value.

The difference between a central bank owning zero-coupon perpetual notes and conventional bonds is that the former cannot be sold to withdraw excess liquidity from the banking system. That means the Bank of Japan would lose a key tool in controlling inflation. So as expectations about rising prices blossomed, Japan’s decades-long battle against deflation would finally end. There are further benefits to this proposal. In one fell swoop, Japan’s public-debt overhang would disappear. As the government’s debt-service costs dried up, Tokyo would be able to fund massive public works.

In reality a zero coupon perpetual bond looks suspiciously like good old-fashion fiat cash, except that the bonds will be held in dematerialisied form – you won’t need a wheel-barrow:-

weimar-mutilated-300x236

Source: Washington Post

Issuing zero coupon perpetuals in exchange for conventional JGBs solves the debt problem for the Japanese government but leaves the BoJ with a permanently distended balance sheet and no means of reversing the process.

Why change tack?

Japan has been encumbered with low growth and incipient deflation for much longer than the other developed nations. The BoJ has, therefore, been at the vanguard of unconventional policy initiatives. This is how they describe their latest experiment:-

QQE has brought about improvements in economic activity and prices mainly through the decline in real interest rates, and Japan’s economy is no longer in deflation, which is commonly defined as a sustained decline in prices. With this in mind, “yield curve control,” in which the Bank will seek for the decline in real interest rates by controlling short-term and long-term interest rates, would be placed at the core of the new policy framework.  

The experience so far with the negative interest rate policy shows that a combination of the negative interest rate on current account balances at the Bank and JGB purchases is effective for yield curve control. In addition, the Bank decided to introduce new tools of market operations which will facilitate smooth implementation of yield curve control.

The new tools introduced to augment current policy are:-

  • Fixed-rate purchase operations. Outright purchases of JGBs with yields designated by the Bank in order to prevent the yield curve from deviating substantially from the current levels.
  • Fixed-rate funds-supplying operations for a period of up to 10 years – extending the longest maturity of the operation from 1 year at previously.

The reality is that negative interest rate policy (NIRP) has precipitated an even swifter decline in the velocity of monetary circulation. The stimulative impact of expanding the monetary base is negated by the collapse it its circulation.

An additional problem has been with the mechanism by which monetary stimulus is transmitted to the real economy – the banking sector. Bank lending has been stifled by the steady flattening of the yield curve. The chart below shows the evolution since December 2012:-

jgb-yield-curve

Source: Bloomberg, Daiwa Capital Markets Europe

10yr JGB yields have not exceeded 2% since 1998. At that time the base rate was 0.20% – that equates to 180bp of positive carry. Today 40yr JGBs yield 0.57% whilst maturities of 10 years or less trade at negative yields. Little wonder that monetary velocity is declining.

The tightening of bank reserve requirements in the aftermath of the great financial recession has further impeded the provision of credit. It is hardly optimal for banks to lend their reserves to the BoJ at negative rates but they also have scant incentive to lend to corporates when government bond yields are negative and credit spreads are near to historic lows. Back in 1998 a AA rated 10yr corporate bond traded between 40bp and 50bp above 10yr JGBs, the chart below shows where they have traded since 2003:-

aa_corps_vs_jgb_spread_10yr_2003-2016-2

Source: Quandl

For comparison the BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate AA Option-Adjusted Spread is currently at 86bp off a post 2008 low of 63bp seen in April and June 2014. In the US, where the velocity of monetary circulation is also in decline, banks can borrow at close to the zero bound and lend for 10 years to an AA name at around 2.80%. Their counterparts in Japan have little incentive when the carry is a miserly 0.20%.

This is how the BoJ describe the effect NIRP has had on lending to corporates. They go on to observe that the shape of the yield curve is an important factor for several reasons:-

The decline in JGB yields has translated into a decline in lending rates as well as interest rates on corporate bonds and CP. Financial institutions’ lending attitudes continue to be proactive. Thus, so far, financial conditions have become more accommodative under the negative interest rate policy. However, because the decline in lending rates has been brought about by reducing financial institutions’ lending margins, the extent to which a further decline in the yield curve will lead to a decline in lending rates depends on financial institutions’ lending stance going forward.

The impact of interest rates on economic activity and prices as well as financial conditions depends on the shape of the yield curve. In this regard, the following three points warrant attention. First, short- and medium-term interest rates have a larger impact on economic activity than longer-term rates. Second, the link between the impact of interest rates and the shape of the yield curve may change as firms explore new ways of raising funds such as issuing super-long-term corporate bonds under the current monetary easing, including the negative interest rate policy. Third, an excessive decline and flattening of the yield curve may have a negative impact on economic activity by leading to a deterioration in people’s sentiment, as it can cause uncertainty about the sustainability of financial functioning in a broader sense.

The BoJ’s hope of stimulating bank lending is based on the assumption that there is genuine demand for loans from corporations’: and that those corporations’ then invest in the real-economy. The chart below highlights the increasing levels of Japanese share buybacks over the last five years:-

nikkei-share-buybacks-may-2016-goldman-sachs

Source: FT, Goldman Sachs

Share buybacks inflate stock prices and, when buybacks are financed with debt, alter the capital structure. None of this zeitech stimulates lasting economic growth.

Conclusion and investment opportunities

If zero 10 year JGB yields are unlikely to encourage banks to lend and demand from corporate borrowers remains negligible, what is the purpose of the BoJ policy shift? I believe they are creating the conditions for the Japanese government to dramatically increase spending, safe in the knowledge that the JGB yield curve will only steepen beyond 10 year maturity.

I do not believe yield curve control will improve the economics of bank lending at all. According to World Bank data the average maturity of Japanese corporate syndicated loans in 2015 was 4.5 years whilst for corporate bonds it was 6.9 years. Corporate bond issuance accounted for only 5% of total bond issuance in Japan last year – in the US it was 24%. Even with unprecedented low interest rates, demand to borrow for 15 years and longer will remain de minimis.

Financial markets will begin to realise that, whilst the BoJ has not quite embraced the nom de guerre of “The bank that launched Helicopter Money”, they have, assuming they don’t lose their nerve, embarked on “The road to infinite QE”. Under these conditions the JPY will decline and the Japanese stock market will rise.

Is the “flight to quality” effect breaking down?

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Macro letter – No 61 – 16-09-2016

Is the “flight to quality” effect breaking down?

  • 54% of government bonds offered negative yields at the end of August
  • Corporate bond spreads did not widen during last week’s decline in government bonds
  • Since July the dividend yield on the S&P500 has been higher than the yield on US 30yr bonds
  • In a ZIRP to NIRP world the “capital” risk of government bonds may be under-estimated

Back in 2010 I switched out of fixed income securities. I was much too early! Fortunately I had other investments which allowed me to benefit from the extraordinary rally in government bonds, driven by the central bank quantitative easing (QE) policies.

In the aftermath of Brexit the total outstanding amount of bonds with negative yields hit $13trln – that still leaves $32trln which offer a positive return. This is alarming nonetheless, according to this 10th July article from ZeroHedge, a 1% rise in yields would equate to a mark-to-market loss of $2.4trln. The chart below shows the capital impact of a 1% yield change for different categories of bonds:-

zerohedge_-_100bp_move_in_yields

Source: ZeroHedge

Looked at another way, the table above suggests that the downside risk of holding US Treasuries, in the event of a 1% rise in yields, is 2.8 times greater than holding Investment Grade corporate bonds.

Corporate bonds, even of investment grade, traditionally exhibit less liquidity and greater credit risk, but, in the current, ultra-low interest rate, environment, the “capital” risk associated with government bonds is substantially higher. It can be argued that the “free-float” of government bonds has been reduced by central bank buying. A paper from the IMF – Government Bonds and Their Investors: What Are the Facts and Do They Matter? provides a fascinating insight into government bond holdings by investor type. The central bank with the largest percentage holding is the Bank of England (BoE) 19.7% followed by the Federal Reserve (Fed) 11.5% and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 8.3% – although the Japanese Post Office, with 29%, must be taken into account as well. The impact of central bank buying on secondary market liquidity may be greater, however, since the central banks have principally been accumulating “on the run” issues.

Since 2008, financial markets in general, and government bond markets in particular, have been driven by central bank policy. Fear about tightening of monetary conditions, therefore, has more impact than ever before. Traditionally, when the stock market falls suddenly, the price of government bonds rises – this is the “flight to quality” effect. It also leads to a widening of the spread between “risk-free” assets and those carrying greater credit and liquidity risk. As the table above indicates, however, today the “capital” risk associated with holding government securities, relative to higher yielding bonds has increased substantially. This is both as a result of low, or negative, yields and reduced liquidity resulting from central bank asset purchases. These factors are offsetting the traditional “flight to quality” effect.

Last Friday, government bond yields increased around the world amid concerns about Fed tightening later this month – or later this year. The table below shows the change in 10yr to 30yrs Gilt yields together with a selection of Sterling denominated corporate bonds. I have chosen to focus on the UK because the BoE announced on August 4th that they intend to purchase £10bln of Investment Grade corporate bonds as part of their Asset Purchase Programme. Spreads between Corporates and Gilts narrowed since early August, although shorter maturities benefitted most.

Issuer Maturity Yield Gilt yield Spread over Gilts Corporate Change 7th to 12th Gilts change 7th to 12th
Barclays Bank Plc 2026 3.52 0.865 2.655 0.19 0.18
A2Dominion 2026 2.938 0.865 2.073 0.03 0.18
Sncf 2027 1.652 0.865 0.787 0.18 0.18
EDF 2027 1.9 0.865 1.035 0.19 0.18
National Grid Co Plc 2028 1.523 0.865 0.658 0.19 0.18
Italy (Republic of) 2028 2.891 0.865 2.026 0.17 0.18
Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau 2028 1.187 0.865 0.322 0.18 0.18
EIB 2028 1.347 0.865 0.482 0.18 0.18
BT 2028 1.976 0.865 1.111 0.2 0.18
General Elec Cap Corp 2028 1.674 0.865 0.809 0.2 0.18
Severn Trent 2029 1.869 1.248 0.621 0.19 0.18
Tesco Plc 2029 4.476 1.248 3.228 0.2 0.18
Procter & Gamble Co 2030 1.683 1.248 0.435 0.2 0.18
RWE Finance Bv 2030 3.046 1.248 1.798 0.17 0.22
Citigroup Inc 2030 2.367 1.248 1.119 0.2 0.22
Wal-mart Stores 2030 1.825 1.248 0.577 0.2 0.22
EDF 2031 2.459 1.248 1.211 0.22 0.22
GE 2031 1.778 1.248 0.53 0.21 0.22
Enterprise Inns plc 2031 6.382 1.248 5.134 0.03 0.22
Prudential Finance Bv 2031 3.574 1.248 2.326 0.19 0.22
EIB 2032 1.407 1.248 0.159 0.2 0.22
Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau 2032 1.311 1.248 0.063 0.19 0.22
Vodafone Group PLC 2032 2.887 1.248 1.639 0.24 0.22
Tesco Plc 2033 4.824 1.248 3.576 0.21 0.22
GE 2033 1.88 1.248 0.632 0.21 0.22
Proctor & Gamble 2033 1.786 1.248 0.538 0.2 0.22
HSBC Bank Plc 2033 3.485 1.248 2.237 0.21 0.22
Wessex Water 2033 2.114 1.248 0.866 0.19 0.22
Nestle 2033 0.899 1.248 -0.349 0.16 0.22
Glaxo 2033 1.927 1.248 0.679 0.2 0.22
Segro PLC 2035 2.512 1.401 1.111 0.19 0.22
Walmart 2035 2.028 1.401 0.627 0.2 0.22
Aviva Plc 2036 3.979 1.401 2.578 0.18 0.22
General Electric 2037 2.325 1.401 0.924 0.23 0.22
Lcr Financial Plc 2038 1.762 1.401 0.361 0.2 0.22
EIB 2039 1.64 1.401 0.239 0.2 0.22
Lloyds TSB 2040 2.693 1.495 1.198 0.2 0.22
GE 2040 2.114 1.495 0.619 0.2 0.22
Direct Line 2042 6.738 1.495 5.243 0.06 0.22
Barclays Bank Plc 2049 3.706 1.4 2.306 0.1 0.22

Source: Fixed Income Investor, Investing.com

The spread between international issuers such as Nestle – which, being Swiss, trades at a discount to Gilts – narrowed, however, higher yielding names, such as Direct Line, did likewise.

For comparison the table below – using the issues in bold from the table above – shows the change between the 22nd and 23rd June – pre and post-Brexit:-

Maturity Gilts 22-6 Corporate 22-6 Gilts 23-6 Corporate 23-6 Issuer Spread 22-6 Spread 23-6 Spread change
10y 1.314 4.18 1.396 4.68 Barclays 2.866 3.284 0.418
15y 1.879 3.86 1.96 3.88 Vodafone 1.981 1.92 -0.061
20y 2.065 4.76 2.124 4.78 Aviva 2.695 2.656 -0.039
25y 2.137 3.42 2.195 3.43 Lloyds 1.283 1.235 -0.048
30y 2.149 4.21 2.229 4.23 Barclays 2.061 2.001 -0.06

Source: Fixed Income Investor, Investing.com

Apart from a sharp increase in the yield on the 10yr Barclays issue (the 30yr did not react in the same manner) the spread between Gilts and corporates narrowed over the Brexit debacle too. This might be because bid/offer spreads in the corporate market became excessively wide – Gilts would have become the only realistic means of hedging – but the closing prices of the corporate names should have reflected mid-market yields.

If the “safe-haven” of Gilts has lost its lustre where should one invest? With patience and in higher yielding bonds – is one answer. Here is another from Ben Lord of M&G’s Bond Vigilantes – The BoE and ECB render the US bond market the only game in town:-

…The ultra-long conventional gilt has returned a staggering 52% this year. Since the result of the referendum became clear, the bond’s price has increased by 20%, and in the couple of weeks since Mark Carney announced the Bank of England’s stimulus package, the bond’s price has risen by a further 13%.

…the 2068 index-linked gilt, which has seen its price rise by 57% year-to-date, by 35% since the vote to exit Europe, and by 18% since further quantitative easing was announced by the central bank. Interestingly, too, the superior price action of the index-linked bond has occurred not as a result of rising inflation or expectations of inflation; instead it has been in spite of significantly falling inflation expectations so far this year. The driver of the outperformance is solely due to the much longer duration of the linker. Its duration is 19 years longer than the nominal 2068 gilt, by virtue of its much lower coupon!

When you buy a corporate bond you don’t just buy exposure to government bond yields, you also buy exposure to credit risk, reflected in the credit spread. The sterling investment grade sector has a duration of almost 10 years, so you are taking exposure to the 10 year gilt, which has a yield today of circa 0.5%. If we divide the yield by the bond’s duration, we get a breakeven yield number, or the yield rise that an investor can tolerate before they would be better off in cash. At the moment, as set out above, the yield rise that an investor in a 10 year gilt (with 9 year’s duration) can tolerate is around 6 basis points (0.5% / 9 years duration). Given that gilt yields are at all-time lows, so is the yield rise an investor can take before they would be better off in cash.

We can perform the same analysis on credit spreads: if the average credit spread for sterling investment grade credit is 200 basis points and the average duration of the market is 10 years, then an investor can tolerate spread widening of 20 basis points before they would be better off in cash. When we combine both of these breakeven figures, we have the yield rise, in basis points, that an investor in the average corporate bond or index can take before they should have been in cash.

With very low gilt yields and credit spreads that are being supported by coming central bank buying, accommodative policy and low defaults, and a benign consumption environment, it is no surprise that corporate bond yield breakevens are at the lowest level we have gathered data for. It is for these same reasons that the typical in-built hedge characteristic of a corporate bond or fund is at such low levels. Traditionally, if the economy is strong then credit spreads tighten whilst government bond yields sell off, such as in 2006 and 2007. And if the economy enters recession, then credit spreads widen and risk free government bond yields rally, such as seen in 2008 and 2009.

With the Bank of England buying gilts and soon to start buying corporate bonds, with the aim of loosening financial conditions and providing a stimulus to the economy as we work through the uncertain Brexit process and outcome, low corporate bond breakevens are to be expected. But with Treasury yields at extreme high levels out of gilts, and with the Fed not buying government bonds or corporate bonds at the moment, my focus is firmly on the attractive relative valuation of the US corporate bond market.

The table below shows a small subset of liquid US corporate bonds, showing the yield change between the 7th and 12th September:-

Issuer Issue Yield Maturity Change 7th to 12th Spread Rating
Home Depot HD 2.125 9/15/26 c26 2.388 10y 0.17 0.72 A2
Toronto Dominion TD 3.625 9/15/31 c 3.605 15y 0.04 1.93 A3
Oracle ORCL 4.000 7/15/46 c46 3.927 20y 0.14 1.54 A1
Microsoft MSFT 3.700 8/8/46 c46 3.712 20y 0.13 1.32 Aaa
Southern Company SO 3.950 10/1/46 c46 3.973 20y 0.18 1.58 Baa2
Home Depot HD 3.500 9/15/56 c56 3.705 20y 0.19 1.31 A2
US Treasury US10yr 1.67 10y 0.13 N/A AAA
US Treasury US30y 2.39 30y 0.16 N/A AAA

Source: Market Axess, Investing.com

Except for Canadian issuer Toronto Dominion, yields moved broadly in tandem with the T-Bond market. The spread between US corporates and T-Bonds may well narrow once the Fed gains a mandate to buy corporate securities, but, should Fed negotiations with Congress prove protracted, the cost of FX hedging may negate much of the benefit for UK or European investors.

What is apparent, is that the “flight to quality” effect is diminished even in the more liquid and higher yielding US market.

The total market capitalisation of the UK corporate bond market is relatively small at £285bln, the US market is around $4.5trln and Europe is between the two at Eur1.5trln. The European Central Bank (ECB) began its Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) earlier this summer but delegated the responsibility to the individual National Banks.

Between 8th June and 15th July Europe’s central banks purchased Eur10.43bln across 458 issues. The average position was Eur22.8mln but details of actual holdings are undisclosed. They bought 12 issues of Deutsche Bahn (DBHN) 11 of Telefonica (TEF) and 10 issues of BMW (BMW) but total exposures are unknown. However, as the Bond Vigilantes -Which corporate bonds has the ECB been buying? point out, around 36% of all bonds eligible for the CSPP were trading with negative yields. This was in mid-July, since then 10y Bunds have fallen from -012% to, a stellar, +0.3%, whilst Europe’s central banks have acquired a further Eur6.71bln of corporates in August, taking the mark-to-market total to Eur19.92bln. The chart below shows the breakdown of purchases by country and industry sector at the 18th July:-

which-corporate-bonds-ecb3

Source: M&G Investments, ECB, Bloomberg

Here is the BIS data for total outstanding financial and non-financial debt as at the end of 2015:-

Country US$ Blns
France 2053
Spain 1822
Netherlands 1635
Germany 1541
Italy 1023
Luxembourg 858
Denmark 586

Source: BIS

In terms of CSPP holdings, Germany appears over-represented, Spain and the Netherlands under-represented. The “devil”, as they say, is in the “detail” – and a detailed breakdown by issuer, issue and size of holding, has not been published. The limited information is certainly insufficient for traders to draw any clear conclusions about which issues to buy or sell. As Wolfgang Bauer, the author of the M&G article, concludes:-

But as tempting as it may be to draw conclusions regarding over- and underweights and thus to anticipate the ECB’s future buying activity, we have to acknowledge that we are simply lacking data. Trying to “front run” the ECB is therefore a highly difficult, if not impossible task.

 Conclusions and investment opportunities

Back in May the Wall Street Journal published the table below, showing the change in the portfolio mix required to maintain a 7.5% return between 1995 and 2015:-

Source: Wall Street Journal, Callan Associates

The risk metric they employ is volatility, which in turn is derived from the daily mark-to-market price. Private Equity and Real-Estate come out well on this measure but are demonstrably less liquid. However, this table also misses the point made at the beginning of this letter – that “risk-free” assets are encumbered with much higher “capital” risk in a ZIRP to NIRP world. The lower level of volatility associated with bond markets disguises an asymmetric downside risk in the event of yield “normalisation”.

Dividends

Corporates with strong cash flows and rising earnings are incentivised to issue debt either for investment or to buy back their own stock; thankfully, not all corporates and leveraging their balance sheets. Dividend yields are around the highest they have been this century:-

dididend-yld-sandp

Source: Multpl.com

Meanwhile US Treasury Bond yields hit their lowest ever in July. Below is a sample of just a few higher yielding S&P500 stocks:-

Stock Ticker Price P/E Beta EPS DPS Payout Ratio Yield
At&t T 39.97 17.3 0.56 2.3 1.92 83 4.72
Target TGT 68.94 12.8 0.35 5.4 2.4 44 3.46
Coca-cola KO 42.28 24.3 0.73 1.7 1.4 80 3.24
Mcdonalds MCD 114.73 22.1 0.61 5.2 3.56 69 3.07
Procter & Gamble PG 87.05 23.6 0.66 3.7 2.68 73 3.03
Kimberly-clark KMB 122.39 22.8 0.61 5.4 3.68 68 2.98
Pepsico PEP 104.59 29.5 0.61 3.6 3.01 85 2.84
Wal-mart Stores WMT 71.46 15.4 0.4 4.6 2 43 2.78
Johnson & Johnson JNJ 117.61 22.1 0.43 5.3 3.2 60 2.69

Source: TopYield.nl

The average beta of the names above is 0.55 – given that the S&P500 has an historic volatility of around 15%, this portfolio would have a volatility of 8.25% and an average dividend yield of 3.2%. This is not a recommendation to buy an equally weighted portfolio of these stocks, merely an observation about the attractiveness of returns from dividends.

Government bonds offer little or no return if held to maturity – it is a traders market. For as long as central banks keep buying, bond prices will be supported, but, since the velocity of the circulation of money keeps falling, central banks are likely to adopt more unconventional policies in an attempt to transmit stimulus to the real economy. If the BoJ, BoE and ECB are any guide, this will lead them (Fed included) to increase purchases of corporate bonds and even common stock.

Bond bear-market?

Predicting the end of the bond bull-market is not my intention, but if central banks should fail in their unconventional attempts at stimulus, or if their mandates are withdrawn, what has gone up the most (government bonds) is likely to fall farthest. At some point, the value of owning “risk-free” assets will reassert itself, but I do not think a 1% rise in yields will be sufficient. High yielding stocks from companies with good dividend cover, low betas and solid cash flows, will weather the coming storm. These stocks may suffer substantial corrections, but their businesses will remain intact. When the bond bubble finally bursts “risky” assets may be safer than conventional wisdom suggests. The breakdown in the “flight to quality” effect is just one more indicator that the rules of engagement are changing.