An overview on financial and commodity markets for last month
An overview on financial and commodity markets for last month
Macro Letter – No 86 – 03-11-2017
Global Real Estate and the end of QE – Is it time to be afraid?
During the past two months two of the world’s leading central banks have begun the process of unwinding or, at least, tapering the quantitative easing which was first initiated after the great financial recession of 2008/2009. The Federal Reserve FOMC statement for September and their Addendum to the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans from June contain the details of the US bank’s policy change. The ECB Monetary policy decision from last week explains the European position.
Whilst the Federal Reserve is reducing its balance sheet by allowing US treasury holdings to mature, the US government has already breached its debt ceiling and will need to issue new bonds. The pace of US money supply growth is unlikely to be reversed. Nonetheless, 10yr US bond yields have risen from a low of 1.35% in July 2016 to more than 2.6% earlier this year. They currently yield around 2.4%. Over the same period 2yr US bond yields have risen from 0.49% to a new high, this week, of 1.60% – their highest since October 2008.
Back in April I wrote about the anomaly in the US interest rate swaps market – US 30yr Swaps have yielded less than Treasuries since 2008 – does it matter? What is interesting to note, in relation to global real estate, is that the 10yr Swap spread over US Treasuries (which is currently negative) has remained stable at -8bp during the recent rise in yields. Normally as interest rates on government bonds declines credit spreads tighten – as rates rise these spreads widen. So far, this has not come to pass.
In the US, mortgages are, predominantly, long-term and fixed rate. US 30yr mortgage rates has also risen since July 2016 – from 2.09% to 3.18% at the end of December. Since then rates have moderated, they now stand at 2.89%, approximately 1% above US 30yr bonds. The chart below shows the spread since July 2016:-
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
Apart from the aberration during the US presidential elections the spread between 30yr US Treasuries and 30yr Mortgages has been steadily narrowing despite the tightening of short term interest rates and the increase in yields across the maturity spectrum.
Mortgage finance costs have increased since July 2016 but by less than 50bp. What impact has this had on real estate prices? The chart below shows the S&P Case-Shiller House Price Index since 2006, the increase in mortgage rates has failed to slow the rise in prices. The year on year increase is currently running at 5.6% and forecasters predict this rate to increase to 5.8% when September data is released:-
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, S&P Case-Shiller
At the global level house prices have not taken out their pre-crisis highs, as this chart from the IMF reveals:-
Source: IMF, BIS, ECB, Federal Reserve, Savills
The latest IMF – Global Housing Watch – report for Q2 2017 is sanguine. They take comfort from the broad range of macroprudential measures which have been introduced during the past decade.
The IMF go on to examine house price increases on a country by country basis:-
Source: IMF, BIS, ECB, Federal Reserve, Savills, Sinyl Real Estate
The OECD – Focus on house prices – looks at a variety of different metrics including changes in real house prices: the OECD average is more of less where it was in 2010 having dipped during 2011/2012 – here is breakdown across a selection of regions. Please note the charts are rather historic they stop at January 2014:-
The continued fall in Japanese prices is not entirely surprising but the steady decline of the Euro area is significant.
Similarly historic data is contained in the chart below which ranks countries by Price to Income and Price to Rent. Portugal, Germany, South Korea and Japan remain inexpensive by these measures, whilst Belgium, New Zealand, Canada, Norway and Australia remain expensive. The UK market also appears inflated but the decline in Sterling may be a supportive factor: international capital is flowing into the UK after the devaluation:-
Bringing the data up to date is the Knight Frank’s global house price index, for Q2 2017. The table below is sorted by real return:-
Source: Knight Frank, Trading Economics
There is a saying in the real estate market, ‘all property is local’. Prices vary from region to region, from street to street, however, the data above paints a picture of a global real estate market which has performed strongly in response to the lowering of interest rates. As the table below illustrates, the percentage of countries recording positive annual price changes is now at 89%, well above the levels of 2007, when interest rates were higher:-
Source: Knight Frank
The low interest rate environment has stimulated a rise in household debt, especially in advanced economies. The IMF – Global Financial Stability Report October 2017 makes sombre reading:-
Although finance is generally believed to contribute to long-term economic growth, recent studies have shown that the growth benefits start declining when aggregate leverage is high. At business cycle frequencies, new empirical studies—as well as the recent experience from the global financial crisis—have shown that increases in private sector credit, including household debt, may raise the likelihood of a financial crisis and could lead to lower growth.
These two charts show the rising trend globally but the relatively undemanding levels of indebtedness typical of the Emerging Market countries:-
As long ago at February 2015 – McKinsey – Debt and (not too much) deleveraging – sounded the warning knell:-
Seven years after the bursting of a global credit bubble resulted in the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, debt continues to grow. In fact, rather than reducing indebtedness, or deleveraging, all major economies today have higher levels of borrowing relative to GDP than they did in 2007. Global debt in these years has grown by $57 trillion, raising the ratio of debt to GDP by 17 percentage points.
According to the Institute of International Finance Q2 2017 global debt report – debt hit a new all-time high of $217 trln (327% of global GDP) with China leading the way:-
Household debt is growing in China but from a relatively low base, it is as the IMF observe, the advanced economies where households are becoming addicted to low interest rates and cheap finance.
Conclusions and investment opportunities
Source: The Economist
The chart above shows a few of the winners since 1980. The real estate market remains sanguine, trusting that the end of QE will be a gradual process. Although as a recent article by Frank Shostak – Can gradual interest rate tightening prevent shocks? reminds us, ‘…there is no such thing as “shock-free” monetary policy’:-
Can a gradual tightening prevent an economic bust?
Since monetary growth, whether expected or unexpected, gives rise to the redirection of real savings it means that any monetary tightening slows down this redirection. Various economic activities, which sprang-up on the back of strong monetary pumping, because of a tighter monetary stance get now less real funding. This in turn means that these activities are given less support and run the risk of being liquidated. It is the liquidation of these activities what an economic bust is all about.
Obviously, then, the tighter monetary stance by the Fed must put pressure on various false activities, or various artificial forms of life. Hence, the tighter the Fed gets the slower the pace of redirection of real savings will be, which in turn means that more liquidation of various false activities will take place. In the words of Ludwig von Mises,
‘The boom brought about by the banks’ policy of extending credit must necessarily end sooner or later. Unless they are willing to let their policy completely destroy the monetary and credit system, the banks themselves must cut it short before the catastrophe occurs. The longer the period of credit expansion and the longer the banks delay in changing their policy, the worse will be the consequences of the malinvestments and of the inordinate speculation characterizing the boom; and as a result the longer will be the period of depression and the more uncertain the date of recovery and return to normal economic activity.’
Consequently, the view that the Fed can lift interest rates without any disruption doesn’t hold water. Obviously if the pool of real savings is still expanding then this may mitigate the severity of the bust. However, given the reckless monetary policies of the US central bank it is quite likely that the US economy may already has a stagnant or perhaps a declining pool of real savings. This in turn runs the risk of the US economy falling into a severe economic slump.
We can thus conclude that the popular view that gradual transparent monetary policies will allow the Fed to tighten its stance without any disruptions is based on erroneous ideas. There is no such thing as a “shock-free” monetary policy any more than a monetary expansion can ever be truly neutral to the market.
Regardless of policy transparency once a tighter monetary stance is introduced, it sets in motion an economic bust. The severity of the bust is conditioned by the length and magnitude of the previous loose monetary stance and the state of the pool of real savings.
If world stock markets catch a cold central banks will provide assistance – though not perhaps to the same degree as they did last time around. If, however, the real estate market begins to unravel the impact on consumption – and therefore on the real economy – will be much more dramatic. Central bankers will act in concert and with determination. If the problem is malinvestment due to artificially low interest rates, then further QE and a return to the zero bound will not cure the malady: but this discussion is for another time.
What does quantitative tightening – QT – mean for real estate? In many urban areas, the increasing price of real estate is a function of geography and the limitations of infrastructure. Shortages of supply are difficult (and in some cases impossible) to alleviate; it is unlikely, for example, that planning consent would be granted to develop Central Park in Manhattan or Hyde Park in London.
Higher interest rates and weakness in household earnings growth will temper the rise in property prices. If the markets run scared it may even lead to a brief correction. More likely, transactional activity will diminish. A price collapse to the degree we witnessed in 2008/2009 is unlikely to recur. Those markets which have risen most may exhibit a greater propensity to decline, but the combination of steady long term demand and supply constraints, will, if you’ll pardon the pun, underpin global real estate.
Linear Talk – Macro Roundup – 17th October 2017
Financial market liquidity returned after the thin trading which is typical of August. Stocks and crude oil were higher and the US$ made new lows. But a number of individual markets are noteworthy.
The S&P 500 and the Nasdaq 100 both achieved record highs last month (2519 and 6013 respectively). In the case of the S&P this is the sixth straight month of higher closes, even as flow of funds data indicates a rotation into international equity markets.
The Eurostoxx 50 took comfort from the US move, closing the month at its high (3595) yet it remains below the level seen in May (3667) tempered, no doubt, by the strength of the Euro.
German Elections, showing a rise in support for the nationalist AfD and the prospect of an unconstitutional independence referendum in Catalonia, made little impression on European equity markets. The DAX also closed at its high (12,829) but, it too, failed to breach its record for the year of 12,952 witnessed in June.
Spain’s IBEX 35 was more susceptible to the political fracas in its north eastern region, but with other markets rising, it traded in a narrow range, closing at 10,382 on the eve of the referendum, having actually begun the month lower, at 10,329.
The Japanese Nikkei 225 remained well supported but still failed to breach resistance, making a high of 20,481 on the 18th. It has since taken out the old high. This move is supported by stronger economic data and revised growth forecasts from the IMF (released after month end).
Currency markets have been dominated by the weakness of the US$ since January. Last month was no exception. The US$ Index made a new low for the year at 90.99 on the 8th but swiftly recovered, testing 93.80 on the 28th. Technically, this low breached the 50% correction of the move from the May 2014 low of 78.93 to the January 2017 high of 103.81. Further support should be found at 88.43 (61.8% retracement) but price action in EURUSD suggests that we may be about to see a reversal of trend.
EURUSD made a new high for the year at 1.2094 on the 8th, amid rumours of ECB intervention. By month end it had weakened, testing 1.1721 on 28th. This has created a technical ‘outside month’ – a higher high and lower low than the previous month. For this pattern to be negated EURUSD must trade back above 1.2094.
EURGBP also witnessed a sharp correction the initial Sterling weakness which was a feature of the summer months. From an opening high of 0.9235 Sterling steadily strengthened to close at 0.8819. Nonetheless, Sterling remains weaker against the Euro than in 2013, amid fears of a ‘No Deal’ on Brexit and continued expectations of an economic slowdown due to the political uncertainty of that exit.
US 10yr Treasuries made a new low yield for the year at 2.02% on 8th. This is the lowest yield since the November 2016 election, however, expectations of another rate hike and the announcement of a planned balance sheet reduction schedule from the Federal Reserve, tempered the enthusiasm of the bond bulls. By month end, yields had risen 32bp to close at 2.34%.
In Germany 10yr Bund yields followed a similar trajectory to the US. Making a low of 0.29% on 8th only to increase to 0.52% by 28th. Increasing support for the AfD in the election, was largely ignored.
A trade which has been evident during 2017 has been the convergence of core and peripheral European bond yields. The larger markets such as Italy and Spain have mostly mirrored the price action of Bunds, their spreads widening moderately in the process. The yield on Portuguese and Greek bonds, by contrast has declined substantially, although there was a slight widening during September. Greek 10yr bonds, which yielded 8.05% at the end of January, closed the month at 5.67%. Over the same period 10yr Bunds have seen yields rise by 6bp.
UK 10yr Gilts also had an interesting month. From a low of 0.97% on 7th they reached 1.42% on 28th amid concerns about Brexit, the recent weakness in Sterling (which appears to have been temporarily reversed) and expectations that Bank of England Governor, Carney, will raise UK interest rates for the first time since June 2007. It is tempting to conceive that either the rise in Gilt yields or the recent rise in Sterling is wrong, these trends might both continue. Long Sterling and Short Gilts might be a trade worthy of consideration.
Perhaps anticipating the IMF – World Economic Outlook – October update, in which they revised their world growth forecasts for 2017 and 2018 upwards, the price of Brent Crude rallied to a new high for the year on 26th – $59.49/bbl. Aside from expectations of an increase in demand, the effect of two hurricanes in the US and a strengthening of resolve on the part of OPEC to limit production, may be contribution factors.
Copper also hit a new high for the year, trading $3.16/lb on 4th. Technically, however, it made an outside month (higher high and lower low than August) a break above $3.16/lb will negate this bearish formation. I remain concerned that Chinese growth during 2017 has been front-loaded. Industrial metal markets may well consolidate, with a vengeance, before deciding whether increased demand is seasonal or structural.
Macro Letter – No 85 – 13-10-2017
European Bonds – warning knell or cause for celebration?
Writing, as government bond yields for peripheral European markets peaked in Macro Letter – No 73 – 24-03-2017 – Can a multi-speed European Union evolve? I felt that another Eurozone crisis could not be ruled out:-
The ECB would almost certainly like to taper its quantitative easing, especially in light of the current tightening by the US. It reduced its monthly purchases from Eur 80bln per month to Eur 60bln in December but financial markets only permitted Mr Draghi to escape unscathed because he extended the duration of the programme from March to December 2017. Further reductions in purchases may cause European government bond spreads to diverge dramatically. Since the beginning of the year 10yr BTPs have moved from 166bp over 10yr German Bunds to 2.11% – this spread has more than doubled since January 2016.
Was I simply wrong or just horribly premature, only time will tell? The December end of the asset purchase programme is growing inexorably closer. So far, however, despite a rise in the popularity of AfD in Germany, the Eurozone seems to have maintained its equanimity. The Euro has not weakened but strengthened, European growth has improved (to +2.3% in Q2) and European stock markets have risen. But, perhaps, the most interesting development has occurred in European bond markets. Even as the Federal Reserve has raised short term interest rates, announcing the beginning of balance sheet reduction, and the ECB has continued to prepare the markets for an end to QE, peripheral bonds in Europe have seen a substantial decline in yields: and their respective spreads against the core German Bund have narrowed even further. Is this a sign of a more cohesive Europe and can the trend continue?
To begin here is a chart of the Greek 10yr and the German 10yr since January, the Bund yield is on the Left Hand Scale and the Greek 10yr Bond on the Right:-
Source: Trading Economics
The table below looks at a selection of peripheral European markets together with the major international bond markets. Switzerland, which has the lowest 10yr yield of all, has been included for good measure. The table is arranged by change in yield:-
This year’s clear winners are Greece and Portugal – the latter was upgraded to ‘investment grade’ by S&P in September. It is interesting to note that despite its low absolute yield Irish Gilts have continued to converge towards Bunds, whilst BTPs and Bonos, which yield considerably more, have been tentatively unnerved by the prospect of an end to ECB largesse.
As an aside, the reluctance of the Bonos to narrow versus BTPs (it closed to 41bp on 4th October) even in the face of calls for Catalonian independence, appears to indicate a united Spain for some while yet. Don’t shoot the messenger I’m only telling you what the markets are saying; in matters of politics they can be as wrong as anyone.
Where now for European bonds?
A good place to start when attempted to divine where the European bond markets may be heading is by considering the outcome of the German election. Wolfgang Bauer of M&G Bond Vigilantes – Angela Merkel’s Pyrrhic victory – writing at the end of last month, prior to the Catalan vote, takes up the story:-
Populism is back with a vengeance
One of the most striking election results is certainly the strong performance of the right-wing nationalist AfD (12.6%). Not only is the party entering the German Bundestag for the first time but the AfD is going to become the third largest faction in parliament. If the grand coalition is continued – which can’t be ruled out entirely at this point – the AfD would de facto become the opposition leader. While this is certainly noteworthy, to say the least, the direct political implications are likely to be minimal. None of the other parties is going to form a coalition with them and AfD members of parliament are likely to be treated as political pariahs. We have seen this happening in German state parliaments many times before.
However, I think there might be two important indirect consequences of the AfD’s electoral success. First, within Germany the pressure on Merkel, not least from her own party, with regards to policy changes is going to build up. For obvious reasons, preventing the rise of a right-wing nationalist movement has been a central dogma in German politics. That’s out of the window now after the AfD’s double digits score last night – on Merkel’s watch. In the past, she has been willing to revise long-held positions (on nuclear power, the minimum wage, same sex marriage etc.) when she felt that sentiment amongst voters was shifting. In order to prise back votes from the AfD she might change tack again, possibly turning more conservative, with a stricter stance on migration, EU centralisation and so on.
Secondly, the success of the AfD at the ballot box might challenge the prevailing narrative, particularly since the Dutch and French elections, that anti-EU populism is on the decline. This could have implications for markets, which arguably have become somewhat complacent in this regard. The Euro, which has been going from strength to strength in recent months, might get under pressure. Compressed peripheral risk premiums for government and corporate bonds might widen again, considering that there are more political events on the horizon, namely the Catalan independence referendum as well as elections in Austria and Italy.
This sounds remarkably like my letter from March. Was it simply that I got my timing wrong or are we both out of kilter with the markets?
The chart below shows the steady decline in unemployment across Europe:-
Source: BNP Paribas Asset Management, Datastream
The rate of economic expansion in European is increasing and measures of the popularity of the Eurozone look robust. Nathalie Benatia of BNP Paribas – Yes, Europe is indeed back puts it like this:-
…take some time to look at this chart from the European Commission’s latest ‘Standard Eurobarometer’, which was released in July 2017 and is based on field surveys done two months earlier, just after the French presidential election, an event that shook the world (or, at least, the French government bond market). Suffice it to say that citizens of eurozone countries have never been so fond of the single currency.
Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer Spring 2017, Public Opinion in the European Union, BNP Paribas Asset Management
The political headwinds, which I clearly misjudged in March, are in favour of a continued convergence of Eurozone bonds. Italy and Spain offer some yield enhancement but Portugal and Greece, despite a spectacular performance year to date, still offer more value. The table below shows the yield for each market at the end of November 2009 (when European yield convergence was at its recent zenith) and the situation today. The final column shows the differential between the spreads:-
Only Irish Gilts look overpriced on this metric. Personally I do not believe the yield differentials exhibited in 2009 were justified: but the market has been proving me wrong since long before the introduction of the Euro in 1999. Some of you may remember my 1996 article on the difference between US municipal bond yields and pre-Euro government bond yields of those nations joining the Euro. I feared for the German tax payer then – I still do now.
I expect the yield on Bunds to slowly rise as the ECB follows the lead of the Federal Reserve, but this does not mean that higher yielding European bond markets will necessarily follow suit. I continue to look for opportunities to buy Bonos versus BTPs if the approach parity but I feel I have missed the best of the Greek convergence trade for this year. Hopes that the IMF will desist in their demands for continued austerity has buoyed Greek bonds for some while. The majority of this anticipated good news is probably already in the price. If you are long Greek bonds then Irish Gilts might offer a potential hedge against the return of a Eurozone crisis, although the differential in volatility between the two markets will make this an uncomfortable trade in the meanwhile.
Back in March I expected European bond yields to rise and spreads between the periphery and the core to widen, I certainly got that wrong. Now convergence is back in fashion, at least for the smaller markets, but Europe’s political will remains fragile. The party’s in full swing, but don’t be the last to leave.
Macro Letter – No 84 – 29-09-2017
Japan – Politics, Central Banking and the Nikkei 225
On Monday Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, called a snap general election. During the press conference in which he made the announcement he said:-
It is my mission as prime minister to exert strong leadership abilities at a time when Japan faces national crises stemming from the shrinking demographic and North Korea’s escalating tensions…
He went on to outline a JPY 2trln stimulus package, to be implemented before year end. This will be financed by raising the consumption tax rate from 8% to 10% in October 2019. The tax increase is expected to generate JPY 5trln/annum and, if any revenue remains after the stimulus, it will be used to reduce government debt. With a further JPY 2trln earmarked for education and social programmes it seems unlikely the maths will add up.
Meanwhile, despite the Federal Reserve’s announcement, last week, that they will begin balance sheet reduction, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) continue their policy of quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE) involving the unorthodox ‘yield curve control’ measures. From more on this please see Macro Letter – No 65 – Yield Curve Control – the road to infinite QE which I published in November 2016. I stand by my conclusion, although my prediction about the JPY (I thought it would continue to weaken) has yet to come to pass:-
If zero 10 year JGB yields are unlikely to encourage banks to lend and demand from corporate borrowers remains negligible, what is the purpose of the BoJ policy shift? I believe they are creating the conditions for the Japanese government to dramatically increase spending, safe in the knowledge that the JGB yield curve will only steepen beyond 10 year maturity.
I do not believe yield curve control will improve the economics of bank lending at all. According to World Bank data the average maturity of Japanese corporate syndicated loans in 2015 was 4.5 years whilst for corporate bonds it was 6.9 years. Corporate bond issuance accounted for only 5% of total bond issuance in Japan last year – in the US it was 24%. Even with unprecedented low interest rates, demand to borrow for 15 years and longer will remain de minimis.
Financial markets will begin to realise that, whilst the BoJ has not quite embraced the nom de guerre of “The bank that launched Helicopter Money”, they have, assuming they don’t lose their nerve, embarked on “The road to infinite QE”. Under these conditions the JPY will decline and the Japanese stock market will rise.
In the long run demographic forces may halt Abenomic attempts to debase the Yen. This 2015 paper from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis – Aging and the Economy: The Japanese Experience – makes fascinating reading. Here is a snippet, but I urge you to read the whole article for an overview of the impact of an ageing population on economies in general, Japan exhibits some unique characteristics in this respect:-
In a third study, economists Derek Anderson, Dennis Botman and Ben Hunt found that the increased number of pensioners in Japan led to a sell-off of financial assets by retirees, who needed the money to cover expenses. The assets were mostly invested in foreign bonds and stocks. The sell-off, in turn, fueled appreciation of the yen, lowering costs of imports and leading to deflation.
Returning to the current environment, on Monday, in a speech to business leaders in Osaka entitled – Japan’s Economy and Monetary Policy – BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda made several observations about the economy, labour market and inflation:-
The economy is expanding moderately, and the real GDP growth rate for the April-June quarter registered a firm increase of 2.5 percent on an annualized basis. It is the first time in eleven years, since 2006, that it has continued to mark positive growth for six consecutive quarters…
The year-on-year rate of increase in hourly wages of part-time employees, which are particularly sensitive to the tightening of the labor market, has registered about 2.5 percent. This is higher than that of full-time employees, implying that the difference in wage levels between part-time and full-time employees has become smaller…
In the labor market as a whole, the unemployment rate has declined to around 3 percent, which is equivalent to virtually full employment, and the active job openings-to-applicants ratio stands at 1.52, exceeding the highest figure during the bubble period and reaching a level last seen as far back as in 1974…
The year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) excluding fresh food has increased to around 0.5 percent recently, but that which also excludes the effects of a rise in energy prices has been relatively weak, remaining at around 0 percent…
Kuroda-san went on to defend the BoJ 2% inflation target and explain the logic behind their ‘QQE with Yield Curve Control’ mechanism. I am struck by the improving affluence of the average worker in Japan. Inflation is zero whilst wage growth, except for the dip in July to -0.3%, has been positive for most of this decade. Real Japanese wages have been rising which is in stark contrast to many of its G7 peers. See Pew Research – For most workers, real wages have barely budged for decades for more on this subject.
The minutes of the July 19th/20th BoJ – Monetary Policy Meeting – were released on Tuesday. They left policy unchanged. The short-term interest rate target at -0.10% and the long-term rate (10yr JGB yield) at around zero. Commenting on the economy they noted continued solid investment, especially by larger firms and the sustained improvement in private consumption. The consumption activity index (CAI) for Q1 2017 showed a fourth consecutive quarterly increase. I was interested in the statement highlighted below (the emphasis is mine):-
…members shared the view that, with corporate profits improving, which mainly reflected the growth in overseas economies, business fixed investment plans were becoming solid on the whole. They also shared the recognition that the employment and income situation had improved steadily and private consumption had increased its resilience. Members then concurred that a positive output gap had taken hold, given the recent tightening of labor market conditions and the increase in capacity utilization rates, with the latter reflecting a rise in production. Based on this discussion, they agreed to revise the Bank’s economic assessment upward to one stating that Japan’s economy “is expanding moderately, with a virtuous cycle from income to spending operating” from the previous one stating that the economy “has been turning toward a moderate expansion.” One member pointed out that Japan’s economy was shifting from a recovery dependent on external demand to a more self-sustaining expansion brought about by an improvement in domestic demand. This member continued that it was also becoming evident that improvements in economic activity had been spreading across a wider range of areas, urban to regional.
The current QQE policies were reconfirmed (emphasis mine):-
With regard to the amount of JGBs to be purchased, it would conduct purchases at more or less the current pace — an annual pace of increase in the amount outstanding of its JGB holdings of about 80 trillion yen — aiming to achieve the target level of the long-term interest rate specified by the guideline.
With regard to asset purchases other than JGB purchases, many members shared the recognition that it was appropriate for the Bank to implement the following guideline for the intermeeting period. First, it would purchase exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITs) so that their amounts outstanding would increase at annual paces of about 6 trillion yen and about 90 billion yen, respectively. Second, as for CP and corporate bonds, it would maintain their amounts outstanding at about 2.2 trillion yen and about 3.2 trillion yen, respectively.
An independent summation of the current environment and the prospects for the Japanese economy comes from an article by Kazumasa Iwata – President of the Japan Center for Economic Research – AJISS – The Future of the Japanese Economy: The Great Convergence and Two Great Unwindings:-
Since bottoming out in November 2012, the Japanese economy has been in an expansionary phase that reached its 58th month in September of this year. Although not yet as long as the economic expansion achieved during the Koizumi reforms (73 months), the current phase exceeded the mark set by the Izanagi boom of the late 1960s (57 months). While this phase is technically termed expansionary, it lacks strength. In contrast to the average growth rate of 1.8% seen during the Koizumi reforms, the average rate in the ongoing expansion has only been about 1%.
The economic strategy underlying Abenomics is to put the Japanese economy on the road to 2% growth. The experiences of the Koizumi reforms demonstrate that it is quite possible to realize 2% growth by implementing an effective growth strategy. This is evidenced by the theory of convergence through technology diffusion. The catch-up attained by China, India and other emerging countries since the 1990s through offshoring and the construction of global value chains has been astounding. Professor Richard Baldwin argues that the start of the Industrial Revolution ushered in an era of Great Divergence for the global economy via technological innovation and capital accumulation in the developed countries and elsewhere, and that from the 1990s we have been in an age of Great Convergence due to rapid drops in information and telecommunications costs.
In contrast to the brisk development enjoyed by emerging countries, Japan has found itself in a two-decade-long period of stagnation, its economy falling far below the convergence line predicted by Convergence Theory…
Japan already failed to boost its productivity during the 1st IT Revolution of the mid-1990s, and it is now in the 2nd IT Revolution, otherwise known as the 4th Industrial Revolution, centered on IoT, AI, and Big Data. OECD research shows that the top 5% frontier companies have not seen a decline in productivity growth since the financial crisis. Other companies lag behind these frontier companies in globalizing and using digital technology (digitalization), which has only widened the productivity gap between them. Were all companies in Japan able to boost their performance on par with the top ten companies utilizing AI and IoT, Japan’s growth rate could be accelerated by 4% (JCER 2017).
It is interesting to note that Iwata-san sees the greatest risk coming from the unwinding of QE by the Federal Reserve and the ECB, combined with the increasingly protectionist stance of US trade policy. He does not appear to expect the BoJ to reverse QQE, nor Abenomics to falter.
What does the forthcoming election and continuation of infinite QQE mean for Japanese financial markets? Firstly here are three 10 year charts, of the USDJPY, 10yr JGBs and the Nikkei 225:-
Source: Trading Economics
Source: Trading Economics
Source: Trading Economics
The Yen has been trading a range this year; it has strengthened against a generally weakening US$, whilst weakening against a resurgent Euro. 10yr JGBs have been held in an effective straightjacket by ‘Yield curve control’. Meanwhile the Nikkei 225 has followed the lead of other equity markets, both in Asia and the US, and marched steadily higher. A break above the highs of August 2015 would see the index trading at its highest since 1997. A dividend yield of 2% (source: Star Capital – as at 30/6/2017) looks attractive compared to JGBs or inflation, although a P/E ratio of more than 17 times and a CAPE ratio above 26 may be cause for caution.
An assessment of financial markets would not be complete without a review of real estate. The BoJ mentioned that house prices have been fairly flat this year. Below is a r chart of the Japan Housing Index and the CPI Index since the financial crisis of 2008:-
Source: Trading Economics, Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs
Real Estate rental yields are currently around 2.5% making property an alternative to stocks for the long term investor. Personally, with dividend yields around 2%, I would want more than 50 basis points to invest in such an illiquid asset: chacun a son gout.
The Geopolitics of North Korea makes Japan vulnerable: Japan’s currency will bear the brunt of this. Given that much of the recent economic growth has been export led, this Yen weakness is unlikely to damage the prospects for the stock market, except perhaps in the short-term.
If Abe wins a convincing mandate on 22nd October, military spending may be added to the mix of public sector stimulus. Pervious consumption tax increases have proved damaging to the nascent economic recovery, this time, dare I say it, might be different. With wages increasing and domestic demand finally beginning to rise, a moderate tax hike maybe achievable, although I still think it more likely that implementation will be deferred.
The table below, which shows the top 10 best value stocks in the Nikkei, was calculated on 28th April. It is produced by Obermatt – click on the name to find out more about Obermatt’s excellent range of services and their valuation methodologies:-
To be clear, being a top-down macro investor, I have not personally delved into the relative merits of the stocks above, but I am comforted to note that most of them are household names, even outside Japan. A testament to the quality of many Japanese corporations.
From a technical perspective one should have bought the chart breakout back in November 2016. The market is close to resistance at 21,000 and I would like to see a monthly close above this level before risking additional capital, however, after nearly three decades of deflationary adjustment, the Japanese economy may be beginning to find sustainable growth. I believe this is despite, rather than as a result of, government and central bank policy: but that’s a topic for another time.